Most recently, we've been able to shift the priority effort to Mosul to address the long-standing security challenges there and to stifle any attempt by the insurgency to rally around that historic center of gravity. Recently, in conjunction with our partnered Iraqi forces, we've been able to establish joint security sites and combat outposts in the heart of Mosul, which is the first critical step in ensuring or in providing consistent security for the people of the city, specifically securing them where they sleep. Our intent is to drive the insurgents from the city and return it to the lawful Iraqi security apparatus while we pursue them, the enemy, wherever else they may be in Nineveh province or in our area of operations.
This will be a steady, methodical coalition and Iraqi security force campaign to eliminate the enemy from Mosul -- challenging, but not another Fallujah-like episode.
While kinetic operations will last for at least a few more months, we are already planning for a robust reconstruction effort to ensure a sustainable security situation. We'll link our actions with the provincial government and an increasingly capable central government. Working with our provincial reconstruction team, we will carry out projects designed to better the day-to-day lives of Mosul citizens, improve local governance and economics, and take steps to help Mosul and all of Nineveh achieve its full potential. The recent passage of the 2008 Iraqi budget will only help to underpin these efforts.
The government of Iraq has also taken steps to enhance our ability to address the enemy situation in Mosul by recently establishing the Nineveh operations command, a three-star headquarters under a Sunni Arab by the name of Lieutenant General Riyadh, a former division commander in Baghdad. This unique headquarters provides critical unity of command to the diverse army, police, and border police structure which has been problematic in the past.
There has been some discussion of the value or need for a CLC, concerned local citizens, SOI, sons of Iraq, or sawha (sp) -- three names for the same thing -- type movement in Mosul. We believe this to be impractical at this time for a couple of reasons. The first being that -- one of the key principles of the CLC approach is the employment of indigenous ad hoc security forces where there are insufficient Iraqi security forces. This isn't the case in Mosul and the greater Nineveh province, where we have partnered with two Iraqi army divisions, about 20,000 personnel total, and an additional 20,000 Iraqi police and an Iraqi border force of 3,500 men.
Another reason for the select application of CLCs in Nineveh is the diverse ethnic composition of the province. Unlike Anbar, Nineveh is composed of Sunni, Shi'a, Christians, Yazidis, Shabak, Arabs, Turkoman and Kurds and dozens of tribes. Favoritism towards any one of these tribes or elements might serve the unintended consequences of disrupting the delicate balance that has existed for decades.
More confirmation that this will be different than past operations.
Once we can strangle and finally break apart al Qaeda in Iraq, it will be easier for Iraqis to hold gains since they won't have a robust terrorist organization attempting to infiltrate into secured areas to restart terrorist networks. Then it will be safer to spread out our smaller force levels to stiffen the Iraqis with combat forces and various support units, and keep a small number of combat brigades pulled back as a strategic reserve.
And without large numbers of our forces involved or Iraqi local defense forces for neighborhood defense, this campaign really will be a test of the Iraqi security forces.
