Should a conflict break out across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwanese forces would face a grave shortage of ammunition after just seven days of fighting. Even though China has a much greater stockpile of ammunition than Taiwan, it would also encounter similar problems in a sustained conflict.
One problem for China is sustaining imported weapons:
The PLA Air Force fleet of third generation fighters comprises 281 Su-30s, Su-27 SKs, J-11A/Bs and 64 J-10As, whereas its bomber fleet includes approximately 48 JH-7As and 117 H-6s. In full-scale warfare across the Taiwan Strait, suppose there were a loss of 20-30 combat aircraft each day, the current fleet of 344 third generation fighters in effective service in the PLAAF could sustain combat operations for only 11-17 days.
That would be an awfully high loss rate far in excess of historic rates. Even assuming each third generation fighter sorties twice per day, would they really lose 2.9 to 5.4 percent per sortie? They certainly might, but it is not an easy thing to predict. And even a higher initial loss rate could drop dramatically if the Taiwanese defenders run low on ammo first, if fighters on the ground and missile batteries are knocked out by attacking missiles and fighters, if bases are captured by the Chinese, or if runways are cratered.
Indeed, in the discussion of ammunition losses the article highlights how often the air-to-air missiles have missed in past conflicts. Are the Taiwanese pilots good enough to inflict losses on the Chinese? Are the Chinese good enough to evade them? Nor do we know if the Chinese really have a supply as limited as the article assumes. Taiwan, certainly, seems to be fine with their lack of ammunition on the assumption we will resupply them (see here and here). But it sure seems like Taiwan's problem is worse. Do they have only four days? Which would assume tremendous ability to move ammunition where it is needed in the chaos of war and while under attack. You could easily have Taiwanese aircraft out of ammo while the ammo they need is on the road or at another base. If Taiwan runs out of missiles for their fighters and SAMs, whether or not the Chinese run out too, Chinese ships and transports will be putting troops onto the island unmolested.
Countries find a way to get around ammunition shortages. They never let that consideration stop a war. If nothing else, they simply assume they don't have to fight for very long.
As for the masses of obsolete Chinese warships, I assume the Chinese figure they are expendible and will actually use them as troop transports. Leave protection of the Taiwan Strait to the modern warships, more advanced submarines, and minefields. Use subs and ballistic missiles to keep our carriers away from Taiwan long enough to win. If the old 1970s vintage warships sink? Who cares? They'd be useless further out to sea against the US Navy anyway.
Yet in the end, the article gets the main point right:
This proves the practicality of the Chinese military's concept of "fighting a quick battle." Obviously the Chinese military is well aware of the hard reality that the current international political dynamics, China's own limited strategic oil reserves and its limited supply of advanced ammunition will not allow it to engage in a prolonged war across the Taiwan Strait.
The Chinese assume a short war. Short to avoid American intervention to save Taiwan. Short to avoid economic dislocations from a long war in which America might blockade China. Short to avoid international condemnsation. And short to avoid running out of modern weapons and ammunition.
Remember, they don't have to be right about their assumptions to hold them.
UPDATE: Strategypage picks up on the ammunition issue. They think air losses of ten percent per day is reasonable depending on how hard the Chinese press the attacks. This is different than a per-sortie loss rate comparison but seems high for an extended period. The bottom line is that for this and other reasons, the Chinese would need to win fast:
If the Chinese do not take Taiwan within a week, they are on the slippery slope to disaster.
It's likely that the Chinese generals are telling their political bosses that an invasion is very risky if tried now, but that the risks will decline year by year, as China's modern forces increase.
This is a different problem than saying China can't take Taiwan, it should be noted. I've always felt China needs to win fast. So forget about lengthy blockades or a long campaign of firing missiles at Taiwan over months. If the Chinese come, it will be hammer and tongs for as long as they can press the issue.
