As President Bush weighs new policy options for Iraq, strong support has coalesced in the Pentagon behind a military plan to "double down" in the country with a substantial buildup in American troops, an increase in industrial aid and a major combat offensive against Muqtada Sadr, the radical Shiite leader impeding development of the Iraqi government.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff will present their assessment and recommendations to Bush at the Pentagon today. Military officials, including some advising the chiefs, have argued that an intensified effort may be the only way to get the counterinsurgency strategy right and provide a chance for victory.
The approach overlaps somewhat a course promoted by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz). But the Pentagon proposals add several features, including the confrontation with Sadr, a possible renewed offensive in the Sunni stronghold of Al Anbar province, a large Iraqi jobs program and a proposal for a long-term increase in the size of the military.
So let's look at the particulars:
1. Deploy more troops to Iraq.
This could be done by increasing the overlap of deploying units. Deploy some early and extend others already in Iraq. This could add tens of thousands of troops for a period of months. I worry about the expectations that could develop. An insurgency takes patience to win. If our public sees the troops marching off and the press raises expectations of really dramatic success, our people who worried about winning but are waiting to see how things go might well become completely defeatist. Plus, I'd rather have more patience than more troops. I don't think a shortage of troops is the problem in pushing progress faster.
2. Build up the size of the Army.
This could be up to 100,000 over five years. This could add 15 to 20 combat brigades if Congress goes along and funds it. Each year, rotating troops through Iraq and Afghanistan would get easier as new units are added to the force. And there would be less need to call on National Guard combat brigades. In one sense, this might buy time to win since we can always say we are waiting for more troops in the pipeline. And Army strain should get lessened each year. We'd also build the ability to surge units for short periods for specific problems without disrupting overall rotations. But will Congress pay for these for the next decade?
3. Increase economic aid to Iraq.
Ten billion per year? Why can't Iraq borrow that money? They've had lots of Saddam-era loans forgiven. I'd rather the international lenders have a stake in Iraq succeeding to repay loans and have the Iraqis have pressure to spend wisely because they are spending loans and not grants. If this aid provides jobs, then good. But I really think this should be funded by European and Arab loans to Iraq.
4. Defeat Sadr's Mahdi Army.
Sadr is the biggest long-term threat to a free and democratic Iraq. With Iranian support, Sadr's thugs could derail the Iraq experiment. And as long as Sadr runs free with his militias, Sunnis who would otherwise end their struggle will not feel safe enough to give up armed resistance and terrorism. Plus, as long as he has armed militias backing him, the government is far more constrained in making tough choices out of fear of Sadr's reaction. If Sadr is dead or nullified and violence is reduced in Baghdad, the government can move forward. I wish we'd nailed Sadr in 2003 or even 2004, as I noted back then repeatedly, but I'm humble enough to accept that we had reasons we believed valid for not ending his threat back then. There is no way to know if we were wrong back then or not in that decision. But today, his armed followers must be defeated, disbanded, and provided with useful jobs to keep them occupied.
5. Go on offense in Anbar against jihadis and their allies.
If a Shia-majority government is going to attack Sadr's Shia militias, they must also go after Sunni terrorists so that Sadr can't argue the government is leaving Shia civilians defenseless against Sunni terror. Plus, this is the major area where Sunni tribes are working with us against al Qaeda in Iraq. Finally, it helps remind people that we are fighting al Qaeda inside Iraq and so we aren't wasting our time on campaigns unrelated to the war on terror. Oh, and a lot of those jobs need to go to the Sunnis to get them too tired to fight while providing them with income.
So there you go. This idea seems to be far more likely than implementing all of the Seventy-Nine Baker Commandments. Most of the elements have aspects that I worry about, but they could be made to work.
Just as long as we don't work ourselves up into viewing this as our "final offensive" to win or die. With expectations that high, we will be bound to be disappointed.
Victory will take time.
UPDATE: More details on the emerging plan:
The nation's top uniformed leaders are recommending that the United States change its main military mission in Iraq from combating insurgents to supporting Iraqi troops and hunting terrorists, said sources familiar with the White House's ongoing Iraq policy review. ...
Sources said that Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top U.S. commander in Iraq, is reviewing a plan to redefine the American military mission there: U.S. troops would be pulled out of Iraqi cities and consolidated at a handful of U.S. bases while day-to-day combat duty would be turned over to the Iraqi army. ...Under the plan developed by Chiarelli's staff, the military would shift about half of its 15 combat brigades away from battling insurgents and sectarian violence and into training Iraqi security forces as soon as the spring of 2007, military and defense officials said.
Does this mean 7 brigades will disperse into Iraqi units? This is beyond embedded training/advisor teams. This appears to be "corsetting" Iraqi units with American units to stiffen them and provide guidance and potent combat power. If so, this means our units won't be out of day-to-day operations. It will mean we will be pushing forward Iraqi units to fight Sadr's thugs and Baathists and assorted jihadis while sharing the missions and risk with them.
Or are half of the brigades to be either redeployed into bases as a reserve and conventional deterrent to Iran and Syria or broken down into training teams an/or small combat units sprinkled throughout the Iraqi army?
Presumably, some units would be sent to Anbar where there are--I think--two Marine regimental combat teams and an Army brigade combat team. These would help seal the border and hunt al Qaeda elements.
It is difficult to evaluate the emerging strategy as yet. It seems to follow the overall path of training Iraqis to take over the fight--which I believe is the broad correctly path--rather than Americanize the fight by shoving the Iraqis aside who are not progressing as fast as we'd like.
One thing it does seem to provide is time. It does not start us on a course that will raise hopes back home for rapid and decisive results. By reducing our presence in the cities while bolstering Iraqis, we should lower casualties and accelerate their readiness to take over. And by focusing offensive combat missions (which will increase casualties) on destroying al Qaeda which is thick in Anbar, we emphasize a mission that continues to have good levels of support in America--fighting al Qaeda. Fighting out west will also undercut our media's impact on the war by putting our troops far from the Green Zone and surrounding areas that our reporters cluster in.
Those who want to win by flooding the country with American troops will be disappointed as will those who want to just get out now or establish timetables for withdrawing. What it does do is support the general strategy that I believe has been correct since November 2003--training Iraqis to take over the fight.
ANOTHER UPDATE: General Schoomaker testified that the Army could add only 10,000 to 15,000 troops to Iraq. So 2-3 brigades could be shaken loose. I assume he means new units which could increase strength in Iraq for a year during their deployment. These units would not have any replacements in line however so the increase would only be for a year. You could get 20,000 more for several months by overlapping rotating units (units in Iraq stay a couple months more and units scheduled to go enter Iraq a couple months early).
But the general notes that surging should be done for a measurable purpose: "We would not surge without a purpose," Schoomaker told reporters. "And that purpose should be measurable." This reflects my concerns about unrealistic expectations of some "final offensive" in Iraq.
AND ONE MORE UPDATE: The WP states the Army may deploy up to 35,000 troops to Iraq--a maximum of 10 brigades if all extra forces are combat brigades. Assuming the earlier estimate of up to 15,000 new troops is good, holding over 20,000 troops in three brigades already in Iraq and bringing in 20,000 troops to Iraq early so the arriving and departing forces overlap would provide the numbers in this article. Again, this could only be for a short time. The 20,000 held over would increase the total as the arriving 20,000 went into the field earlier than planned. But this peak increase would only be for a few month, although depending on the pace of arrivals and departures, you might have increased numbers from overlap for six months. I can't imagine extending units more than three months. The new 15,000 could stay a year to fifteen months. Then we're back to baseline strength
They key is to use them for something useful. I've never been opposed to increasing troops for specific mission--like securing the electons. Once the measurable succeess takes place, the troops go home. So do we set the goal for these extra troops as Sadr's head on a pike mounted at the entrance to the Green Zone? A campaign of a few months against the Mahdi Army to break them would be a good use of extra troops. As long as the Iraqis are with us every step of the way, of course.
