Yes, we'd stay in Iraq and fight the bad guys when we had to, which seemed mostly to be when they decided to attack us first. Our resolve was intended to give the Iraqi people the sense that they were being given control of their future, and to give Iraqi politicians the sense that they had a chance to forge a new kind of country in which everybody could prosper.
For this reason, we relented on several occasions when we had a chance to score a major victory over the bad guys. Because politics was more important than military victory, because playing the game was more important than killing the enemy, we chose to lose.
After the beheading of Americans in Fallujah, we had the city surrounded - but, because it seemed an attack on Fallujah would be problematic for Iraqi politics, we pulled back. We had the Shiite monster Moqtada al-Sadr in our sights as well, but let him go as well for fear Iraq's leading Shiite cleric would turn on us.
Each of these decisions seemed prudent at the time. In retrospect, they seem disastrous. Our failure to take Fallujah after the deaths of Americans gave the enemy the sense that we were weak. Our failure to kill Sadr has led to a situation in which he has excessive power over the elected government.
I think he is only partly correct. The political side is what will starve the insurgencies of oxygen in the end. The military provides the shield for political (and the related economic and social progress) to win over neutrals to the government's side and push enemies into the neutral or even friends columns. Even as we have started and stopped, the political side has moved forward in many areas. But not fast enough to balance out our growing weariness with the slow rate of overall progress.
What is wrong I believe is the idea that we have a choice between either fighting or pushing political moves. I heartily agree that we made an error in holding off on Fallujah in April 2004 and against Sadr in May and August 2004. I said so at the time. (See here, here, here, here, and here.)
Our military campaign should go on without pause for political talks. We should never halt them or slow them down as a gesture of reconciliation. Letting up the pressure that led the enemy to want to talk gives the enemy a chance to recover. When they recover, making concessions doesn't seem nearly as necessary as it did the day before the pause of our military operations. Then we have to ramp up the pressure all over again to reclaim the position we once had. Do that enough and our enemy learns to believe that we'll never pin them to the mat when we have the advantage
So, yes, we must push our military campaign ruthlessly (no, not massive bombardment--ruthlessly at the level of violence necessary) and relentlessly.
But the political side is the side that will end the war with victory. Let the enemy and their supporters talk to us. But make sure the sound of gunfire as Iraqi and American troops kill the enemy and the sight of Sunnis fleeing central Iraq are always present in the talks. The enemy needs to know that the longer they drag out the talks, the worse the future will be for them--not that buying time will allow them to weaken us and emerge victorious. Make sure that we are all clear that talking is about how the enemy can avoid complete destruction and not about who wins the war.
In the end, we must destroy the willingness of the Sunnis to fight. And short of genocide or expulsion of Sunni Arabs from Iraq, convincing Iraqi Sunnis that it is futile to fight (by never letting up on hunting them down) and safer to lay down their arms (by allowing them a non-Baathist role in a free Iraq) is our only real alternative.
And we need to do the same for the Sadr thugs. We had them by the balls in August 2004 and then let them go. What a surprise that they didn't react with gratitude and lay down their arms.
Multi-task, people. Multi-task. Killing our enemies and talking to them are not mutually exclusive.
