It Ain't Heavy, It's My Main Battle Tank

I wrote several years ago in Military Review that our Abrams and heavy forces are not obsolete and that the FCS was too ambitious in trying to be light and lethal simultaneously. I thought that Desert Storm confirmed the value of heavy armor rather than signal its demise. But instead, too many drew the conclusion from 1991 that our tanks are too heavy. Victory was assumed and we just needed to lighten our units to collect our victory faster.

Fighting an actual war in Iraq has changed thinking and this reality is changing plans formerly based on hopeful theories.

First, the FCS is getting heavier:

The issue of how to transport Future Combat System Manned Ground Vehicles still dogs the program after a recent review of key FCS requirements, according to an industry official.

Early requirements for the program stipulated the vehicles had to remain under 20 tons and be small enough to be deployed by a C-130 airlifter. However, contractors for the program are indicating that the vehicles will be 24 tons and deployable in a variety of ways.

The Army has been coy about decisions regarding MGV weight and transportability. While indicating FCS is moving in the direction of heavier vehicles, senior Army officials have said the service has little intention of actually deploying FCS vehicles by C-130.

Perhaps it can still be as lethal as the Abrams while being light enough to be airlifted. Perhaps. Maybe one day. But why make it too heavy to be airlifted yet too light to survive combat? Once you go over the C-130 limit of 20 tons maximum, why hold below 70 tons if that is what is needed to survive, fight, and win? Once we go to 24 tons, why not 30? Or 40? Or 50? This is still lighter than Abrams. And if we need to go to 70 tons, do it. We're not airlifting them at 24 tons anyway (and even at 19 tons we wouldn't be airlifting many--our airlift has more jobs than planes).

So just in case wo don't create the wonder tank, we are keeping the Abrams production line open in recognition that the heavy tank is not yet obsolete as was thought before the Iraq War:

The transformation of the Army continues. It's just that part of the transformation involves keeping the M-1 Abrams main battle tank production lines open for an extra eight years. Operations in Iraq have affirmed heavy armor's worth, according to Army Times.

As I wrote in Military Review in summer 2002:

Barring successfully fielding exotic technologies to make the FCS work, the Army must consider how it will defeat future heavy systems if fighting actual enemies and not merely suppressing disorder becomes its mission once again. The tentative assumptions of 2001 will change by 2025. When they do, the Army will rue its failure today to accept that the wonder tank will not be built.

Heavy armor still gives me a warm and fuzzy feeling of security in a dangerous world. The Abrams will be around for decades, I think. Time enough to design a new heavy tank if we don't build the wonder tank.