Recently, after six years of development, the U.S. Navy successfully test fired its new 155mm AGS (Advanced Gun System) cannon. Designed for use on the new DDG 1000 ("Zumwalt") destroyers, the AGS fires GPS guided shells up to 190 kilometers. The recent test firing of two shells only went out to 81 kilometers. The GPS guidance enables the shells to land inside a 50 meter (155 foot) circle. The AGS shells carry 11 kg (24 pounds) of explosives. The AGS uses a water cooled barrel, so that it can fire ten rounds a minute for extended periods. Each AGS carries 335 rounds of ammo, which is loaded and fired automatically. The AGS shell is expected to enter service in three years. ... Adding a terminal guidance system to the AGS shell would make it suitable to attacking other ships.
When relatively cheap surface ships equipped with targeting drones and long-range precision cannons can strike at this range (and longer as research continues), why will we need to build expensive and vulnerable super carriers to project power?
Shoot, we have our old boomers used as Tomahawk floating batteries. Wouldn't AGS allow even submarines that briefly surface to use the weapon? Why couldn't we build vertically mounted--or angled, I suppose--cannons in the submarine hull like missile tubes? They wouldn't have the range of cruise missiles. But if the target is within 190 kilometers, how many 155mm shells could a submarine put on targets at 10 rounds per minute per gun? A lot more than 150, I'd say. And the sub wouldn't even need to retire from the campaign area to reload as often.
At some point we have to say that it isn't cost-effective to pour more and more money into defending carriers from proliferating and cheap weapons that find and target them. Carriers are surely useful against countries with no air and sea power when used as floating air bases. Especially with precision weapons that reduce the problem of limited magazine capacity on carriers. Like the battleship before them that found a niche role in shore bombardment (and air defense with all that hull to mount anti-aircraft weapons) when the aircraft carrier took the lead sea control role, in our new network-centric world that allows us to spread out our offensive power on many hulls (with air and shore-based assets integrated, too), the carrier can be useful for decades to come in power projection ashore when the carriers don't face significant air and naval opposition.
But carriers don't need to be our primary sea control weapon when we have lots of sensors, cheap long-range missiles, and even cheaper long-range precision shells that can be spread out among all our naval assets (and even on auxiliary cruisers outfitted in war time) and networked together to mass effect even when massing assets is suicidal.
The Navy faces major decisions on force structure. As it was, we couldn't afford what we wanted. What chance does the Navy have of getting what it wants in the current budget environment? The Navy will choose what our future Navy looks like even if they don't face the decision of what role our carriers will play in our fleet.Decisions--or no decision--have consequences.
