Judging from his actions, Assad believes that the key to survival is to keep the domestic protests contained. To achieve this with a limited and in parts unreliable army he seems to be attacking the centers of protest one at a time. He lets protests simmer in some cities while brutalizing the main target, then turns from that target to the next. This approach, ghastly and brutal as it is, seems to be working at present and time is probably on his side.
I noted this necessity back in early May. This is way different than a hearts-and-minds approach that counts on blanketing an area with a minimum ratio of troops to separate insurgents from people. This is grabbing (some of) them by the balls and hoping their hearts and minds follow.
During the Iraq War, I sometimes noted that we had an advantage in our counter-insurgency in that we had the majority of the Iraqi people on our side and could protect them because we really did liberate the vast majority of them. We were not, as the charge was often made, "occupiers."
What, I asked, would we do against a hostile population that we truly did conquer? We're seeing what you need to do in Syria, I suppose. At least we're seeing what you need to do when you don't have the resources to spend years pacifying people who don't like you much. It should at least be a lesson that our brand of counter-insurgency really has a narrow range of applicability rather than being something that applies more broadly in every aspect of how we did it in Iraq.
I don't know if time is on Assad's side, however. I think he has limited time to win. The willingness to kill versus the willingness to be killed is not the only factor in this struggle. With Saudi Arabia turning on Assad, the cash flow from the Sunni Arab world has been cut off, I assume.
Does the Syrian economy fall apart and send Assad's connected supporters into exile or drive them to consider a bargain where they keep their riches under a new order in exchange for turning on Assad?
Or do Syrians in the more remote parts of the country (especially the east where they have access to support from Iraqis) start an armed resistance?
Could Western sanctions have an effect?
HAHAHAHA!!! I kid! No, sanctions are unlikely to be significant as long as Iran steps in with their aid to prop up Assad.
More seriously, does Turkey intervene to set up a humanitarian safe zone in a belt inside Syria where those fleeing Assad's security forces can find safety (without entering Turkey to burden them)?
Assad isn't acting like he is worried he might fall. Let's hope he is wrong.
