Our main effort is to partner with and develop the Afghan security forces to achieve security primacy and to set the conditions for security, governance and economic development for the benefit of approximately 7 1/2 million Afghans in the 14 provinces and 160 districts that comprise Regional Command East. We have built upon the successes of Combined Joint Task Force 101 and sustained the momentum and continuity of this campaign.
Our current focus, shoulder to shoulder with our Afghan security force partners, is to expand the Kabul security zone and interdict insurgent infiltration along the 450-kilometer Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
That still sounds like shaping to me. We're not trying to pacify, but are working on securing Kabul and interdicting the border influx from Pakistan. And we're building up the Afghan forces in preparation for the area becoming the main effort.
And since it isn't the main effort and our efforts in the border areas are stopping infiltration rather than control, stuff like this happens:
Hundreds of militants from Afghanistan launched a pre-dawn cross-border raid on Pakistani paramilitary posts on Saturday, killing up to 36 people, government and security officials said.
Becoming the main effort requires Kandahar and Helmand to be more secure to allow us to draw down US and other Coalition forces in those provinces to shift them to the east. I wonder when the shift in mission takes place?
Of course, with our surge component coming out faster than I'd like (and some allied contingents heading out, too), how will we shift forces from the south to the east without too much risk of losing ground in the south again? And can we get enough force in the east?
And it would help if Pakistan does a better job on their side of the border.
I think we can win. But then, I thought we could prevail without the last surge component. But a rapid draw down sure does make the job of moving the pieces on the board more difficult.
