Monday, April 04, 2011

The Caveat War

How can we win in Libya the way we restrict our level of violence?

The war in Afghanistan is mostly an American fight. Other than the British and Canadians who have line infantry battalions that fight, the other allies have so many restrictions on what their soldiers can do ("caveats") that ISAF--the International Security Assistance Force banner they serve under--is known to American troops as " I Saw Americans Fight." But in the end, since Americans, British, and Canadians (for now) actually fight to win, the timidity of many of our allies isn't crucial. There are useful tasks even for cautious soldiers, however unfair it is to Americans who bear the burden.

But in Libya, it is all caveats, all the time--even for Americans:

Media reporting and military briefings suggest that NATO airstrikes have been restricted to Qaddafi's forces and equipment that are advancing, resupplying positions in contested areas, or engaged in the command-and-control of forces threatening civilian populations.  They have not, by all accounts, targeted even heavy weapons that remain stationary in areas friendly to Qaddafi.  It appears—although this is less clear—that they have also refrained from striking elements of a loyalist force that maneuvered through the desert to outflank rebels advancing on Sirte.  This restraint is in line with the language of the UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the operation—NATO forces do not appear to have a mandate to protect armed rebel forces under attack by Qaddafi loyalists.  Presumably for that reason, NATO refrained from striking Grad missile launchers--the destruction of which is well within the technical capabilities of the alliance—that were shooting at armed rebels.

In what world does this make sense? What are we doing in Libya?

I would love to win in Libya. I'd love President Obama to get the credit. But how are we going to achieve it other than by relying on sheer, dumb luck to get there?