The sergeant writes about Iraqi security forces:
The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)--a joint term referring to Iraqi army and Iraqi police--are so rife with corruption, insurgent sympathies and Shia militia members that they have zero effectiveness. Two Iraqi police brigades in Baghdad have been disbanded recently, and the general sentiment in our field is "Why stop there?" I can't tell you how many roadside bombs have been detonated against American forces within sight of ISF checkpoints. Faith in the Iraqi army is only slightly more justified than faith in the police--but even there, the problems of tribal loyalties, desertion, insufficient training, low morale and a failure to properly indoctrinate their soldiers results in a substandard, ineffective military. A lot of the problems are directly related to Arab culture, which traditionally doesn't see nepotism and graft as serious sins. Changing that is going to require a lot more than "benchmarks."
He also writes about how to fix this problem:
We need to backtrack. We need to publicly admit we're backtracking. This is the opening battle of the ideological struggle of the 21st century. We cannot afford to lose it because of political inconveniences. Reassert direct administration, put 400,000 to 500,000 American troops on the ground, disband most of the current Iraqi police and retrain and reindoctrinate the Iraqi army until it becomes a military that's fighting for a nation, not simply some sect or faction. Reassure the Iraqi people that we're going to provide them security and then follow through. Disarm the nation: Sunnis, Shias, militia groups, everyone. Issue national ID cards to everyone and control the movement of the population.
He also writes that problems aren't being reported up the chain of command:
Tell your American commanders that it's OK to pass up bad news--because part of the problem is that these issues are not reaching above the battalion or brigade level due to the can-do, make-it-happen culture indoctrinated into our U.S. officers. While the attitude is admirable, it also creates barriers to recognizing and dealing with on-the-ground realities.
These are serious problems he describes. One, the culture of Iraq is preventing the Iraqi security forces from fighting effectively. Two, we need to totally revamp our strategy and take over security until we can overcome the effects of local Arab culture on the Iraqi security forces. And third, American commanders don't report problems to senior commanders.
So what about this soldier's complaints and solutions?
Let's start with his solutions. Reimpose direct rule; put in up to half a million American troops; disband most of the Iraqi security forces and start over, instilling a sense of nationalism in the forces; reassure the Iraqis we will provide security and then do it; disarm all Iraqis of all weapons; register all people and control all movement in the country.
These are just ridiculous. Direct rule? So after promoting democracy we take it back? That will go over well. Just how do we instill nationalism in the Iraqis without inspiring nationalism to eject us as occupiers? Sure, it would be nice if we could recruit police and soldiers who felt more Iraqi than Shia, Sunni, or Kurd, but we might as well wish for a pony. When our people won't have the street sense to police Iraq, just how will we provide that security? I'm really fascinated to see how we will confiscate every weapon that Iraqis have--even those allowed for self defense. The terrorists and insurgents will have weapons but the people of Iraq won't be able to defend themselves when our troops aren't around to protect them? That will go over well, too, I dare say. And shutting down movement of people won't instill resentment! No way! This is an ideological struggle, the sergeant says, and yet we are to clamp down with direct rule and an American military campaign, and abolish the steps we've taken toward democracy.
Oh, and where do we get the 500,000 troops to occupy Iraq? And then rotate new troops in? For years?
As for the culture that is interfering with producing troops that are as effective as we'd like, the same culture produces soldiers and police all over the region that manage to police their people and suppress insurgencies. Saddam managed with an even worse culture to draw his troops from. And just what culture is the enemy drawing their terrorists and gunmen from? Vermont? The enemy has the same problem with the local culture as we do. This culture is just a fact of life to adapt to, and we can't just wish it away as something we can fix easily. The Iraqi army will never be as good as ours. Police will never be as effective as ours. But they are better than the enemy and so will win. That is the proper comparison--not comparing them to our troops.
I do worry that the sergeant's complaint that bad news doesn't reach the top. But is this true? I certainly have seen problems discussed up the wazoo in our press. How are these issues leaking out? Are our leaders truly ignorant of the problems even if middle level officers don't pass them up? Don't they see the news? Don't they ask questions?
Perhaps this is truly a problem. I hope not, since we must be able to adjust to bad news in order to win. But I'm not convinced this is actually the problem the sergeant says it is. His views on how to solve the problems we face are so unrealistic that I have difficulty taking this plausible complaint seriously.
I appreciate the sergeant's sacrifice of serving in Iraq to protect us. And I'm glad he wants to win. But I seriously disagree with his assessment of the problems and his proposed solutions.
We have to fight with the Iraqis we have and not the Iraqis we wish we had.
