On the armor front, the EFV's armor is expected to provide protection from 14.5mm rounds and shell fragments. The EFV's level of protection against the IED land mines that have already destroyed several Amtracs in Iraq with heavy casualties is not clear, however; nor is its ability to include reactivce armor or other measures to deal with the growing RPG threat. Given these uncertainties, there has been some criticism that notes the EFV's number of Marines carried and the cost, and wonders if the USMC is simply building an expensive and casualty-maximizing IED/RPG trap.
Marine Corps advocates counter that the EFV's water maneuverability will give them "over the horizon" launch capabilities (about 25 miles out to sea) that protects the Navy ships carrying them, while offering firepower upgrades and greater combined-arms compatibility with heavier units that do offer RPG protection.
So it will be no better than the AAV and still hold lots of Marines who can die in one RPG hit or IED blast. Well that's certainly learning lessons.
And why, so that the Marines can have a single vehicle to get them to shore and march deep inland like a mechanized force? Why?
Why not build a vehicle that can get Marines to shore and across the beach a short distance inland--say 20 miles to protect against enemy artillery--and then land Bradley Fighting Vehicle units to pick up Marines for a drive inland? The Marines already have AAV units that they attach to Marines needing a lift ashore. Why not have Bradley units to give them a lift inland for the deep mission?
Why not? Because Inchon and the Pacific campaign of World War II loom large in the Marine tradition. Their anthem may say from the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli, but the real Marine tradition is almost exclusively drawn from a short period of 1942 to 1950 when large amphibious assaults against tough enemies were routine and dramatic. the Marines will not willingly give up amphibious warfare as their central focus no matter how many times they fight in inland campaigns as the most significant allied force our Army can count on. In this role, big expensive yachts on tracks are the wrong weapon.
And I'm not impressed with the protection aspect of driving from over the horizon. As a means of gaining surprise, sure. But for protecting the amphibious warfare ship? Are we really going to hit a beach so dangerous that our Navy can't let the enemy ashore see them? And if so, how will EFVs survive whatever defenses are too threatening for the amphibous ships that launch them?
And at 10 to 20 million dollars a pop, over a thousand of these are pretty expensive weapons to relive the glory days of Iwo Jima and Inchon. Face it, the Marines need Bradleys to fight inland more than they need a new vehicle to avoid another Tarawa. Learning the lessons of 50-60 years ago but ignoring 1991 and 2003. Although to be fair, the Marines learned from 1991 that they needed Abrams instead of their old M-60 series tanks. I guess I'm shocked they didn't build a floating tank to go from ship to Baghdad in one bound.
Buy Bradleys for when the Marines come ashore uncontested and have time to plan a war at the Army's side inland and a much smaller number of EFVs for the rare opposed landing.
I guess I'm still calling for a reassessment of the Marine Corps' central role as much as I'm questioning the EFV. The five years since this was published haven't changed my mind.
