I don't think Ukraine can use a body count strategy to defeat Russia. Russia has the strategic initiative on the ground and so can regulate its expenditure of men and materiel to what it believes it can cope with.
The war goes on. Ukraine seems to have pulled its troops out of the most distant parts of their Pokrovsk salient. But Russia has yet to capture or trap Ukrainian troops still there. Ukraine is counter-attacking, hopefully to allow a withdrawal from the near-pocket. Russia is deploying more troops to this region. And depending on who I read it is either to exploit their success or to cope with their failure to maintain momentum.
There is lots of talk about a proposed deal that is being portrayed as a virtual ultimatum to Ukraine but which Russia has already rejected as anything but a basis for talks. I remain worried "peace" will just be a period of Russia reloading. And Ukraine must agree with the final agreement. And yes, the sale or lease of some territory may be necessary.
Absent a Russian ground force collapse or financial and government collapse in Moscow, Ukraine won't retake significant territory--let alone all of it. I hope Russia is struggling to hold up their Potemkin Village of confidence. Yet I can't rule out a Ukrainian breakdown somewhere on the front line that proves fatal operationally.
The Ukrainians with their drone line hopes to inflict casualties on the Russians so heavy that the Russians can't continue the war. Ukraine's top drone commander is focusing on killing enemy drone operators. But that is a sub-goal:
More broadly, he says drones must aim to kill or wound as many Russian troops as are deployed in Ukraine each month — a number estimated at 35,000. This can be achieved by creating a deep “kill zone” between the frontline and traditionally safer rear areas.
To feed the Red Machine throwing itself at Ukraine's defenses, Russia is mobilizing reservists purportedly for local defense:
The Kremlin has begun involuntary partial reserve call-ups as part of its wider initiative to build out its active reserve, likely for use in combat in Ukraine.
Can Ukraine out-kill Russian mobilization efforts? Let's go to the Vietnam War for a relevant lesson.
Well, the strategy, as it evolved, became a strategy of attrition, that the South, with US assistance, would inflict such losses on the North, that the flow of supplies and personnel from the North would be unable to replenish it, and the crossover point would come, where the forces of the North and the Vietcong in the South would become weaker and weaker and weaker, because they could not be reinforced, the losses could not be replaced from the North. Others amongst us believed that crossover point would never come. It never did.
In part it never crossed over because the killing of North Vietnamese troops was done on the strategic defensive. That meant that when casualties got too much for North Vietnam to cope with, it slowed down its attacks to let its ability to generate men and materiel to send south catch up with losses.
America needed the ability and willingness to go on offense to maintain the killing rate under that strategy. Whether within South Vietnam and and into neighboring territory, if not all the way to Hanoi.
Indeed, I observed this aspect of a body count strategy regarding the Iran-Iraq War:
By simply pausing instead of furiously fighting Lemming-like until all weapons and ammunition are expended, these two states fought for nearly eight years.
While that was about the materiel side, this applies to manpower side in the Winter War of 2022. If human losses get too bad, Russia can rein in their offensives to recover.
The most interesting thing about the crossover point strategy in Vietnam is that despite America's inflated body count, I read that the North Vietnamese actually lost more troops than we tracked. That meant our "inflated" count turned out to be accurate.
And the crossover strategy still didn't work.
Mind you, killing the enemy isn't bad. Especially when it is all you can do in the face of relentless Russian ground attacks. Russia is no doubt hurting despite government chest thumping and poo flinging.
But Ukraine needs the ability to go on offense if it hopes to have a reasonable chance of overwhelming Russia's ability to cope with casualties and achieving an operational effect that helps liberate at least some of their territory.
And maybe compel Putin--or people around him who insist--to agree to peace.
UPDATE (Monday): All the panic about America siding with Russia was premature:
A joint statement [by Ukraine and America] said talks on a US-backed plan in Geneva, which are now understood to have concluded, were "highly productive".
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said there had been a "tremendous amount of progress" on honing the plan, but there was "still some work to be done" before a final agreement could be put to Russia.
As I observed in the recent Weekend Data Dump:
I remain unclear on what the proposed peace deal in the Winter War of 2022 means. There is a lot of panic. And I do have concerns. I support Ukraine. But there has long been reflexive panic not validated by reality. And even concern based on Trump's Taliban deal must consider changes under Biden.
Breathe, people.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: I made the image with Bing.
