Are the Russians and Ukrainians going to build the ability to move the front in wholesale scales as Russia initially did and as Ukraine did later in 2022? It doesn't really look like it.
The war goes on. The hot spot of the week continues to be Pokrovsk and the nearly pinched Ukrainian salient east and southeast of that wrecked city. Russia is still trying to capture it.
Russian and Ukrainian air campaigns take a toll as they expand in scope and volume. The Russians bleed heavily to claw their way forward at a pace so slow as to defy comprehension that their troops keep advancing into death. And Ukraine's infantry shortage continues, flaying my hope that Ukraine has been holding back infantry to form a strategic reserve. Is either side capable of breaking out of the ground stalemate somehow?
RUSI has a report on emerging method of restoring maneuver in the Winter War of 2022. The ability to mass effects to counter massed forces has crippled operations.
Russia has responded with better controlled fires and infiltration of expendable poor quality infantry to slowly advance despite heavy casualties.
Ukraine has responded by going on the defensive (local counter-attacks excepted) to preserve scarce infantry with a thin front line and inflict losses on the attacking Russians using firepower with an emphasis on small drones that they can build themselves.
Ukraine makes Russia pay a heavy price to attack; but Ukraine's response enables Russia's response to "work".
Clearly, Russia hopes to eventually overwhelm the Ukrainians; and Ukraine hopes to eventually exhaust the Russians. Despite these changes, I still don't know who will be proven correct.
To me, it doesn't seem like the Russians are trying to rebuild a mobile capability as it is trying to be a more effective bulldozer. Ukraine is trying to restore some movement (back to RUSI):
Ukrainian commanders have divided their operations to seize a contested sector into approximately seven phases, usually spanning five to 10 days of operations. This practice does not constitute doctrine but is rather a synthesis of how multiple officers described their approach to the author, although their exact language varied. To seize a contested sector, the force must survey it, isolate it, degrade the enemy, fix their forces, suppress them, close and destroy them, and then consolidate control of the sector. These phases are described below.
The illustration at the top from the report shows the enemy forces that help define this type of operation. But it doesn't seem that different--other than having armored vehicle support to reduce casualties--from Russia's new method of attack that uses air and ground fires plus drone strikes behind Ukrainian lines in order to disrupt supply and reinforcements for forward units, and make them vulnerable to attack.
What is missing is exploiting rather than simply consolidating the gains after destroying the enemy in the contested sector. We shall see.
But what the combatants are doing nearly four years into the war reinforces my caution in Army magazine about drawing firm lessons for organizing, equipping, and employing the Army from a war that isn't even over yet. I based my warning on adaptations for the World War I Western Front.
But to be fair, the report is about emerging lessons. Work the problem. Let's not get over our skis in the PowerPoint presentations.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: Image from the RUSI report.
