The Army has roles in air defense and logistics for the joint force. But the Army is the only service capable of conducting large-scale ground combat operations. Does I Corps realize that?
The pivot to the Pacific is affecting the Army's corps in INDOPACOM:
The U.S. Army’s I Corps is at a moment of strategic transition, shouldering the responsibility of shaping the service’s readiness across the vast, complex Indo-Pacific theater.
It's not a transition until I Corps is shouldering the responsibility for large-scale combat operations in INDOPACOM, as I argued for in Military Review:
In any future emerging confrontation in the Asia Pacific, the U.S. Army eventually will have to take a pivotal role in order for the United States to prevail. Therefore, the U.S. Army must consider and prepare for a role in the Asia-Pacific region that goes beyond merely fighting anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats to the Navy to one that better accounts for the value of large-scale land operations in support of a joint campaign.
Yes, yes. The pivot hasn't reached that point yet. Crawl, walk, run, and all that.
And how can the Navy and Air Force sustain such a campaign? The tyranny of distance and Chinese anti-access/area denial weapons are real.
But thinking about transitioning to a large-scale ground combat role should be evident right now, shouldn't it?
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
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NOTE: Map from the Military Review article.
