Tuesday, February 13, 2024

There is No One Neat Trick for Stopping Aggressors

Sanctions are part of a complete aggressor-stopping breakfast.

This author argues that sanctions usually don't work:

The last year has shown significant shortcomings when it comes to West’s ability to use economic statecraft as a tool in international politics. Almost all schemes developed to weaken potential opponents have either failed or were less effective than expected. 

The author describes the failures against Russia and China, concluding:

Sanctions, as they so often do, turn into what the former US Secretary of State George Shultz called “a wasting asset.” He describes the fact that imposing restrictions on certain goods will only motivate the target-country to develop those goods with their own technological capabilities. When asked about the history of sanctions, the energy expert Anas Alhaji told Brussels Signal that the story is almost always the same: “In the end, they always fail.”

The author does not really argue for admitting defeat and ending sanctions. Although his argument to flood the market to cheapen Russian energy exports founders on Green rabid opposition to fossil fuels and OPEC ability to cut production to sustain prices.

But while his objections to sanctions could be taken as arguments to resist the Axis of Steal, others can take up that implied conclusion--sanctions are a vain attempt to halt their aggression--with his argument. That much is clear because he does not argue for strengthening sanctions to make them work. Or provide alternatives to stop Russia's invasion of Ukraine or China's ambitions to invade Taiwan.

Mind you, I agree that sanctions are usually a failure--as a silver bullet solution to foreign problems.

But let's define failure, shall we? 

If you assume sanctions are the silver bullet, yes they fail--they are a "wasting asset" as the author rightly notes. Eventually, a sanctioned state can find people ready to sell sanctioned items to them.

But the costs will be higher. The quality of sanctioned products acquired will be lower. Counterfeiters will seek even higher profits and Russians under pressure to find products won't look too closely, no? And while the sanctioned state may not see reductions in quantity of a particular valuable system fielded, the higher costs will reduce other areas of production.

The time it takes to evade the sanctions means that lost growth during that time is lost for good:

Post-Soviet Russia became dependent on Western components and machinery for their defense industries. So yes, sanctions hurt Russia despite leakage. So: "For over a decade Russia has been trying to make their economy more efficient and productive. This has been crippled by corruption, economic sanctions, and a shortage of qualified personnel. As a result, growing Russian defense spending produces less and less of what the military needs."

And it isn't only making key imports scarce, expensive, and of poorer quality:

Economic sanctions imposed on Russia for invading Ukraine have also made it difficult for Russia to deliver oil to customers, so Russia then cut its oil prices.

There's a lot more on sanctions in that post.

Further, it isn't a fire-and-forget measure. That time of lost economic growth can be extended as sanctioning states constantly search for sanction breakers and revise their enforcement to cope with evasion means:

Russia is working to adapt to sanctions even as the West works to tighten them. But: "Economic sanctions have been increasingly popular during the last century, even though they rarely work as intended. A current example of this is what happened to Russia after they invaded Ukraine. Russia continues to suffer high economic costs caused by the economic sanctions imposed by most Western nations. Russian leaders realize even now that, if the cost of continuing the war against Ukraine reaches the point where more and more Russians experience declining living standards, they might lose. A growing number of Russians see the Ukraine War as something they can’t afford and can justify getting out of."

And in the case of Russia, sanctions are not the only weapon since Russia openly invaded Ukraine two years ago. Now the West helps Ukraine send invader body bags back to Russia to really impose more noticeable and personal costs on Russians. 

In America (heck, in China, too), we go into a freak out over our standard of living when growth slows (as we should), but Russia can just shrug off economic problems caused by sanctions? Even if they don't collapse Russia? That's not a realistic standard for measuring success or failure.

In the end, sanctions are a means of increasing costs to enemies rather than subsidizing their mayhem with our cash and normalized trade, as we repeatedly do with Iran. Is that really futile?

UPDATE: Whatever role sanction are playing, Russia's economy is facing problems:

Each new Russian scheme for circumventing restrictions involves extra costs and relies on more middlemen of low repute. The economic model based on the high-value export of hydrocarbons and channeling revenues into the military-industrial complex, which depends on the import of critical components and technologies, is resulting in diminishing returns and accelerating breakdowns. 

Russian bravado should not be taken as proof their economy is just fine.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.