This author describes Russian strategy in the Mediterranean Sea:
Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is focused on three key goals: taking advantage of the Mediterranean’s geographical position to improve Russia’s security, using Russia’s position in the Mediterranean to increase Russia’s status as an alternative world power to the United States, and providing support for the Syrian regime. The strategy has three key elements. The first element is the positioning of a credible military force in the Mediterranean. A permanent force in the region is important for several Russian objectives, including protecting Russian approaches and reducing Russia’s vulnerability to surprise.
While I see Crimea as a staging area to project power into the eastern Mediterranean Sea, I'm not sure what the author in that initial article means by this:
Russia has moved air defense batteries into Crimea, where these batteries provide further cover for Russian platforms operating in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean.
How, pray tell, can anti-aircraft missiles in Crimea provide air defense coverage over the eastern Mediterranean Sea?
The S-400 has a maximum range (with the missile with the longest reach) of 250 miles; and the distance from Sevastopol in Russian-occupied Crimea to Tobruk, Libya at the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea is over 1,000 miles while the distance from Sevastopol to Antalya, Turkey at the northern edge is almost 550 miles. How does Russia cover the Med with missiles at the very southern tip of Crimea?
Further, notwithstanding the author's note that the Russians are reinforcing their Black Sea fleet (the weakest of the four main fleets), unless Turkey--which controls the Turkish Straits--sides with Russia in a war with NATO, how does Russia support their fleet in the Mediterranean Sea from the Black Sea?
I see Russia's strategy in the Mediterranean Sea as having just one goal--a forward shield to protect Russia from military approaches from the southwest. The second goal the article notes is really part of the one goal that I see; and the goal of supporting Syria isn't a goal--it is a means to the one goal.
But Russia's naval weakness means that their naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea will live a brief but exciting life during a war with NATO (and until they die, won't be any threat at all in the Black Sea).
Unless Russia manages to collapse the NATO position in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Then the Russian fleet there might last a bit more than briefly, as long as Bulgaria and Italy hold firm in NATO and if Jordan, Israel, and Egypt stand with America.
I'm just not worried about Russia's navy (other than their SSBNs, of course) let alone their naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea.
Have a ball, Russia. We'll call it a draw.
