This seems like a recognition of reality, especially in the Pacific where China's navy and land-based air and missile forces seek to keep enemy fleets away from their shores:
The U.S. Marine Corps wants to completely rewrite the playbook when it comes to amphibious warfare. It seeks to counter the growing A2/AD threat by proliferating platforms and increasing reliance on long-range fires and unmanned systems to penetrate enemy defenses. Marine landing forces will employ a combination of extremely sophisticated air capabilities, centered on the F-35B and MV-22 and fast-moving ground units equipped with new platforms, like the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, to conduct long-range, mobile operations. As General Berger described his vision: “We need a force capable of denying freedom of naval maneuver to deter our adversaries; or, as necessary, a Corps capable of exploiting, penetrating, and degrading advanced adversary defenses in all domains in support of Naval and Joint Force operations.”
Dispersal is a good thing in that environment. And I wrote about dispersing Marine forces in Proceedings (membership required).
Yet the author of that first article has a point:
But to dismiss the utility of major landing operations is to ignore both the realities of operations in the Indo-Pacific region and the history of the last two centuries. Simply put, in the event of a major conflict in this region, the Navy and Marine Corps will inevitably be required to seize, control, and operate from land locations.
Assuming that the dispersed Marines succeed in helping the Navy (and Air Force and even the Army is in the game) defeat the A2/AD threat, at that point multi-brigade operations against the shore become possible. And perhaps necessary. I discussed major land operation options in INDOPACOM in Military Review.
The problem is that the basic mission of the Marines is to go ashore in force to spearhead land operations. For that mass and large amphibious ships are necessary.
But until control of the seas is achieved in the face of enemy A2/AD capabilities--or against their efforts to control the seas--you can't risk mass close to the shores. Dispersed Marines that can operate in the shadow of those capabilities in order to help gain that sea control are needed.
How do the Marines and Navy balance that? I wrote an article last year addressing that subject that was shot down. I should revisit it.
