Israel faced the weakness of their Iron Dome defensive system:
While the Israeli Iron Dome anti-rocket system has been successful since it entered service in 2011, a May 2019 attack with 700 rockets and mortar shells fired from Gaza demonstrated a known weakness. Although Iron Dome has handled 2,1oo interceptions since 2011 the recent May attack was the first time the Islamic terrorists deliberately tried to exploit the one known weakness; you can overwhelm an Iron Dome battery if you fire too many projectiles in a short period of time. The 2019 attack killed four Israelis and wounded 130. The concentrated rocket fire meant 14 percent of rockets headed for populated areas were not stopped. Worse, the Palestinians were using larger rockets fired at more distant (and densely populated) targets. In previous attacks Iron Dome had intercepted 90 percent of rockets headed for populated areas.
I've noted the weakness before. Which is why I think that if the Israelis face a sustained rocket barrage--as Hezbollah in southern Lebanon can initiate--the only way to defend against them is to occupy the rocket-launching sites with ground troops:
While I keep reading that Israel has greatly improved their ability to hit targets from the air, this continues the basic error of 2006. I think the aerial focus was the problem in the 2006 war and turning the aerial campaign to 11 is the wrong lesson.
I think the Israelis need to send in the ground troops to occupy the rocket launching areas and drive north into Hezbollah's rear areas to really tear up Hezbollah.
I just don't believe that an air campaign can stop the rockets. Keep in mind that the system was really just designed to protect a small number of military targets in war and only popular outcry has led to its use to protect civilians.
Although the Hezbollah arsenal of larger and longer range rockets is a greater threat, Israel's Iron Dome can at least identify those more dangerous rockets and focus on destroying them rather than the smaller rockets that will be part of the barrage aimed at Israeli civilians.
But is Hezbollah so broke because American sanctions are squeezing their Iranian paymasters (after suffering so many casualties fighting for Assad in Syria) that it will keep its head down and avoid fighting Israel? Will Israel consider that faux peace good enough to resist the chance to hit Hezbollah while they are down, as I have long expected?
One thing that the initial Strategypage post notes is that Israel faces 10,000 rockets in Gaza and 30,000 in southern Lebanon. Just a few years ago the Hezbollah arsenal was pegged at 100,000. Is this a revision or a mistake?
*Keep in mind that deliberately trying to kill civilians the way Palestinians in Gaza did is a war crime. You don't even need to get into the rules of war that consider the factors of whether a military objective is involved in a strike that kills civilians by accident or whether the target uses civilian human shields. (And yes, from that first link, Hezbollah does the latter: "Hezbollah has built homes, hospitals, Mosques and schools over these [rocket] stockpiles.")
And let's not get into the "proportionality" nonsense that often raises its ugly head.
