Since the rebellion in Syria began I've wanted to support rebels in order to get revenge for Syria's role in helping our enemies kill our troops and friends (from Lebanon in the 1980s to the Iraq War).
As jihadis rose in strength and attracted recruits because they were the most effective rebels (being on a mission from God adds determination even if it costs lives) I thought focusing on the jihadis played into Assad's hands. Defeating Assad first risked a temporary jihadi win in more territory than they already had in western and northwestern Iraq and in eastern Syria, but defeating ISIL would also be a high priority for a lot of countries.
I figured that if we focused on the jihadis, by the time they were defeated the coalition would tire of the fight and let Assad win from sheer weariness (I was especially worried the Obama administration would feel this way). I repeated my worry as ISIL was going down for the count in Syria.
Better, I thought, to defeat Assad and leave the jihadis to last whose presence would motivate the coalition to stick together to defeat them.
And recall my win, build, win strategy called for building up non-jihadi resistance in Syria to take on the jihadis once Assad was defeated.
We did not follow that script exactly. But we did in fact prioritize Iraq over Syria although it included a concurrent campaign in Syria despite the Iraq priority. And we did build up non-jihadi resistance in Syria to replace ISIL, but we focused on fighting ISIL in Syria while we helped Iraq roll back ISIL.
So now we have basically defeated ISIL as a proto-state (it wasn't really a state government as much as it was an organized looting organization on the ground it controlled) and Assad is still standing, while Assad and Russia are declaring victory and Iran is starting to exploit the victory to build up options for fighting Israel.
I was correct to worry, right?
Maybe not. Secretary of State Tillerson announced that America would stay in Syria to basically protect our anti-ISIL partners who don't want Assad to rule them; and that we will work on a diplomatic track to unseat Assad and his minority government.
This was the follow-up task for win, build, win that I didn't think the Obama administration was ready to take. Trump seems to have taken it.
We shall see if the coalition hangs together when the going gets tough. Luckily Arab states have reason to stick with this to harm Iran; and Europeans have reason to stick with it to help stop refugee flows. Yes, they have reason to back Assad to do the same thing, but if America won't walk away and allow an Assad victory.
And Turkey isn't inclined to allow an Assad victory despite their worries about encouraging Kurds. Given that Syrian Kurds are likely willing to stay within a post-Assad Syria that gives them some autonomy, Turkey might have enough incentive to back America to avoid a de facto independent Syrian Kurdistan under American protection.
And this is one thing I didn't consider with my thinking that we should fight the jihadis last in Syria:
The defeat of ISIL changed the outcome of the rebellion, or did it? Until late 2017 everyone more (the West and their Arab allies) or less (Assads, Russia, Iran, Turkey) concentrated on fighting ISIL. This effort appeared to have destroyed the rebel advantage because early on most Syrian rebels embraced Islamic radicalism. This was because most of the population was Sunni Moslems who the Shia Assads suppressed and exploited for decades. That meant that after 2012 Islamic radical rebels spent most of their time fighting other rebels. With the defeat of ISIL the rebels are much weakened but more willing to cooperate with each other. Meanwhile the coalition that saved the Assads is falling apart and that process is getting messier.
Will the defeat of ISIL strengthen rebels? Do read it all (down to the Syria section).
Remember, the Syrian military is still crippled and bled white, relying on Iranian sponsored local militias and foreign fighters plus Russian logistics and air support. If the odd coalition that saved Assad (by fighting parallel campaigns that served to bolster Assad) falls apart post-ISIL and the remaining rebels strengthen with continued foreign support and new recruits who in the past went to ISIL because they are the most effective anti-Assad fighters (and were the cool "bad boys" on the Islamic block), Assad could still lose this war.
I might still be right that failing to target Assad first was a mistake. A lot still has to go right to dethrone Assad's regime. But the outcome of defeating ISIL first in Syria hasn't been the clear path to a weary Western acceptance of Assad that I feared. We shall see.
Funny enough, I wrote a very similar post a couple months ago wondering whether post-Syria Assad was just an interim step to post-Assad Syria when the announced strategy was forming (I stumbled across the post while looking for some of my links).
