Ah, so there's my pucker factor now:
Gaps and limitations in Russia’s early warning capability have long been documented by foreign observers. And while North Korea has never been the adversary Russian radars are designed to watch, a failure to see North Korean ICBMs could mean Russia instead detects missile interceptors fired by the United States as a unique threat, rather than a response to a launch by Pyongyang. (Joshua Pollack explored that possibility, complete with diagrams and maps in 2009.)
If Russia's early warning system to detect missiles inbound is shaky, what does a nuclear-armed North Korea do with an early-warning "system" likely to be little more than following Trump's Twitter feed do to the stability of our MAD world?
Will North Korea have a policy of launching-on-any-warning, no matter how little credibility it has just because North Korea won't risk losing their nuclear arsenal in an enemy first strike?
And depending on how weak Russia's early warning system is or becomes, North Korea might leverage Russia's arsenal against America by launching a lot of missiles at Russia that Russia may assume must be American. And then Russia might launch a nuclear strike at America "in retaliation."
And as other states proliferate nukes, it raises a problem of identifying sources of nuclear strikes during a nuclear attack.
In the Cold War, the Soviet Union and America could each assume a sizable attack had to be from the other side. So nuclear retaliation was simple. If you are hit by a few nukes, you can take the time to figure out for sure who launched them. If scores, hundreds, or thousands are flying your way, it was safe to assume the other superpower was doing it.
How will the world sort out nuclear launches when so many states have nukes? Will everyone just ride out an attack and take the time to figure out who did the deed?
Or will dangerous assumptions propelled by a use-them-or-lose-them posture lead to bad targeting decisions that prompts a chain reaction of launches?
But no worries, we can totally cope with North Korean nukes with a policy of deterrence.
Tip to Instapundit.
UPDATE: Given my worries, this is one Russian military upgrade I'm fully behind:
Despite budget problems caused by lower oil prices and sanctions Russia has moved forward more quickly than expected in building and deploying its new Voronezh family of early-warning radars. In 2013 it was believed seven of the nine radar system would not be complete until 2018 but at the end of 2017 Russia announced that three more Voronezh radars (one M and two DM models) were operational. The three new ones monitor activity in China and the Middle East. Two more are under construction in northern Russia to monitor activity in North America while a tenth, and last one, is being planned for Crimea, which Russia took from Ukraine in 2014.
The last thing I want is the paranoid Russians making decisions based on their fears rather than solid radar data.
UPDATE: A late update about an event I had forgotten about when the Russians misinterpreted a publicized 1995 Norwegian scientific rocket launch:
An alert was passed up the Russian chain of command, all the way to then President Boris Yeltsin. For the first time ever he activated his “nuclear keys” in preparation for launching a nuclear retaliation. Submarine commanders were given the order to stand by and prepare to launch.
Before the final button (metaphorical–the process is more complicated) could be pushed, word reached the decision makers that the rocket was headed on a safe trajectory and was not a threat to Russia. In the end, the alert was rescinded.
Close call. But those were Russians. North Korea armed with nukes who we simply deter will have a much better early warning system, command and control network, and reasonable people in the loop. Right?
Have a super sparkly day.
