The force of obliviousness is strong in this one:
The rapprochement between Iran and its negotiating partners on the core nuclear issue is obvious. No one at this point seriously believes that Iran is maintaining an active program to develop nuclear weapons, though not long ago it was almost conventional wisdom that the country was close to having them.
Now the focus is on ensuring that Iran would need a year or so to assemble a nuclear device if it ever decided to do so. But the concept of “breakout time” is dubious. If trust were to collapse, and the Iranian regime decided to abrogate all of the relevant international agreements, it is highly likely that it would get its weapon, even if the country itself was bombed repeatedly. The strategic emphasis on “breakout time” is thus misplaced. [emphasis added]
I hate to point out the obvious, but if an agreement is needed to keep Iran from having the ability to assemble a nuclear device in less than a year (breakout time), might that not explain why Iran does not have an active program to develop nuclear warheads (as opposed to ballistic missiles to deliver them?
That is, the project worked. Or they have an alternate proxy program in North Korea that allows fools to believe Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons ambitions.
He goes on to say that the key isn't breakout time, but moving Iran to not wanting nukes. Yeah, nice work if you can get it, eh? That is the obvious problem.
Mullah nutballs are poor raw material for convincing them to be domestic policy wonks who overcome unfortunate anger management issues.
Yet the author also says this:
Just as conservative forces in Iran can be expected to try to stop an agreement, forces thriving on confrontation in the United States and elsewhere will do the same.
Oh darn, he violated my rule for taking an author seriously:
If President Obama and his defenders can't tell the difference between Iran's hardliners who want nukes and our "hardliners" who want a deal that actually keeps Iran from getting nukes, how am I supposed to trust the administration can tell the difference between Iranian hardliners and "moderates?"
Yeah. Our hardliners don't thrive on confrontation. They are willing to confront Iran to keep them from going nuclear. Iran's hardliners want no limits on getting said nukes.
So buh bye, Mr. Bildt. He's well practiced in carrying out the West's end of a nuclear deal with Iran.
That this isn't obvious is disturbing.
