Is this really an endorsement of the Kerry-Lavrov deal?
“It’s not complete yet," he went on. "We are concerned that they may not have declared all of their capacity. But what has been removed has been removed. We’re talking about 90 percent. We appreciate the effort that has been made and the results that have been achieved."
The chemical weapons of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime have posed a murderous threat to Israel, and there is broad relief in Jerusalem that this particular menace appears to be dissipating. Obama actually gets more credit for the deal in Israel -- particularly among leaders of the country's national-security apparatus -- than he often does in Washington.
For now, Syria is less of a chemical weapons threat to Israel. So they like that. No doubt.
And remember that a lot of Israelis like dealing with Assad as the devil they know. Despite everything else, the Assad regime kept the Golan frontier quiet. So if Assad has no chemical weapons, that's a bonus.
We, of course, can care more about the "everything else" that Assad does more than Israel cares.
Most importantly, even from Israel's point of view, the deal is only good if it disarms Syria and Syria does not rearm when the crisis passes.
Even from our point of view, I did admit there was a silver lining to the deal:
This deal isn't necessarily a fatal blow to our national interests and reputation if the end result is fewer WMD out there by the time Assad's regime falls despite the best efforts of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah to save Assad.
But this requires our government to keep their eye on the ball and remember that chemical warheads don't kill people--bloodthirsty dictators and their minions who order chemical warhead use kill people.
If the worry is that our intervention will lead to Syrian chemical weapons use against us and others, eliminating Assad's declared WMD reduces that threat.
If the worry is that the fall of the Assad regime will leade to loose WMD that could get into the hands of jihadis in the post-Assad chaos, eliminating Assad's declared WMD reduces that threat.
But the key to these good side effects is that Assad does not use the deal to leverage his own survival by defeating the rebellion.
Indeed, I reviewed the progress of the deal and saw hope of a success that would require me to reverse my condemnation of the deal:
If we can get chemical weapons out of Syria quickly, the Kerry-Lavrov deal won't be so bad. Indeed, it could be very good.
Can we get Assad's chemical weapons out of Syria by the end of the year? If so, that frees us to resume pressuring Assad to go without the fear that Assad could use chemical weapons on our forces or against an ally that helps us--on top of protecting civilians from that particular brand of horror.
And resuming our pressure, support for rebels, and threat of military force will destroy Assad's pledge to his supporters that he can defeat the rebellion in six months under the shield of the Kerry-Lavrov agreement.
I did say that if the rebellion endures the suspension of our pressure while the chemical weapons are eliminated that it would give us more freedom of action to focus on getting rid of Assad.
As originally portrayed, the deal was stupid, giving Assad at least a year of respite as we destroyed chemical weapons. But if we can implement it by getting the chemical weapons out of Syria quickly, then it doesn't matter how long it takes to destroy them at sea. Assad loses his shield much faster than he counted on.
So expect Assad to interfere with that timetable as much as possible as he realizes what the December 31st deadline means.
If we pull that off, I will retract every dismissive thing I've said about this deal and the embarrassment we suffered leading up to the deal, and congratulate President Obama for a true episode of smart diplomacy.
The key was and remains will we seek the defeat of Assad?
I will repeat, if we can avoid the defeat of the rebels while the chemical weapons are removed, we will create more freedom of action to actively seek the defeat of Assad. Without chemical weapons, Assad has no answer to our ability to intervene--from actively helping rebels to direct intervention (and I lean to the former).
As long as you can live with the idea that this was purchased at the price of several thousand dead per month of Assad's continued resistance, we're good.
And as long as we actually seek the defeat of Syria (which, do not forget, will be a defeat for Iran, Hezbolllah, Hamas, and Russia, not to mention al Qaeda if we get a government in Damascus that will fight jihadis rather than treat them as an asset).
If Assad is defeated, we win. Our enemy Assad is defeated and Syria has no (or fewer, depending on what was declared) chemical weapons.
If Assad survives, we lose. Assad lives to terrorize another day and he will be able to rebuild (and modernize) his chemical arsenal destroyed over the last year.
