The Army sadly needs to prove its relevance in a casualty-averse budget world.
Good luck with that. The Army can never win this battle in peacetime, it seems.
As for the casualty issue, we only think ground warfare is cheaper in lives because we haven't fought a real navy in a long time:
We like to think of land warfare as casualty intensive and air and naval warfare as cheap in lives. But lose one carrier battle group in the middle of the ocean and we could lose more sailors in one day than we lost in the entire Iraq War on the ground over years.
And we forget that in World War II, it was about as dangerous to be a bomber crew flying over Germany as it was to be in the infantry.
So let me just dwell on the stupid within the stupid in that "relevance" article:
The phrase “we have to reduce our tail is creeping back into our lexicon,” said Lt. Gen. Raymond V. Mason, Army deputy chief of staff for logistics. “But how much risk can we take?” he asked. “People bring up just-in-time logistics … and talk about business practices,” he said. “Don’t get me wrong. There's a place for business practices. But the closer you get to where people are fighting, business practices don't make sense,” said Mason. “Just-in-time logistics is a dangerous thing. There are money people and programmers who want to drive us there.”
Ah. "Just-in-time logistics." Otherwise known as "dying efficiently." I eagerly await the new acronym.
This is a concept that won't die despite experience.
I attacked the concept in 2002, before the Iraq War, as an aside in an article in the May-June 2002 Military Review:
Such a solution, if even possible, may not be wise if it creates a force that is vulnerable to even a hiccup in the supply line. Think of how simple the enemy's task is if he knows that merely slowing the supply flow can bring great benefits. That is far easier than severing a supply link for weeks as is necessary when iron mountains can sustain forces without a supply line. Some in-theater support and iron hills, as opposed to iron mountains, may be necessary so units can defend themselves at least a short time if the supply link is severed.45 Otherwise, we rely on an enemy who is too unimaginative, passive, or incapable for secure logistics. The Persian Gulf war taught many Americans that winning is easy, but the Army should not act on that assumption. Underestimating an opponent to that degree would be criminal.
I know I brought up the issue of our supply dumps during the twin Sadrist al Qaeda offensives in spring 2004. When our supply lines were under attack, having supply depots rather than just-in-time logistics was vital. That was pre-Blogger and I can't find anything. Perhaps I'll look a little harder.
And in Afghanistan, it seemed like we learned our lesson:
The Army keeps 45 days worth of fuel on the ground in Afghanistan so that operations can withstand severe disruptions to its supply lines, Stevenson said.
That was three years ago.
But now? Well, efficiency is the goal. Not victory. Not even force protection. The stupid does not die.
I can hardly wait for the acronym.
