An all-volunteer military does require more spending than Taiwan seems prepared to spend.
But I find the active-reserve component to be most interesting.
There are three parts to this.
One, the active military will be small:
Under current plans, by early 2015 the armed forces should be composed of 176,000 volunteers, from the 235,000 volunteers and conscripts at present, for a total active duty force of 215,000 (from 270,000).
That is small. But remember that this force just has to defend Taiwan and not project power around the globe. It leaves room for a lot of brigades fully capable of operating on Taiwan. If well trained and funded, they can react quickly to a Chinese invasion.
Two, even with an all-volunteer military, the Taiwanese are retaining conscription:
It should be stated from the outset that, as it is understood in the U.S. or the U.K, Taiwan’s envisioned AVF system is a misnomer and will remain so as long as the constitution hasn’t been amended. That is because while the policy focus is on recruitment of volunteers, young males of service age will continue to complete a mandatory four months of basic training, which has gone down from 12 months at present and 24 months at its height. According to critics, those four months are insufficient to provide those who undergo training with the necessary skills to be able to take up arms in the defense of their country.
Four months is insufficient to be a soldier in a high quality active army unit. But four months is enough to learn how to operate weapons and learn squad-level tactics.
Clearly, the 4-month troops are intended to be reservists who can be called up for local defense. These guys are fully capable of manning squad-sized road blocks to resist very light Chinese paratroopers or special forces trying to move around the island. And they allow the better trained active duty volunteers to focus on battalion and brigade operations that immediately deploy to fight the invasion force.
And three, the active force is top-heavy:
The Ministry of National Defense’s Department of Integrated Assessment, which consulted with the U.S. on the matter, has fixed Taiwan’s active force size at 215,000, optimally with a 1:2:2 officer/NCO/soldier ratio.
Or a ratio of officers to enlisted of 1:4.
Before the Iraq and Afghan campaigns, the US Army had a 1:12 ratio. And we generally keep more officers to expand the Army. Note that we were able to expand our brigades by close to 50% in only a few years because we had the officers (and senior NCOs) to lead troops. Normally you'd need a lot of time to adequately train the higher ranks and give them experience. We see that problem in Iraq where the Iraqi army has had to start from virtually scratch to train an army.
Clearly, the active component of the Taiwanese military is expected to supply the officers and NCOs for a whole lot of mobilized reservists. To me, a good active force and a large reserve force for local defense duties is a reasonable plan for their ground forces.
Of course, the Taiwanese need to understand that they are fully capable--if they fight--of defeating a Chinese invasion despite China's massive relative size. No force structure or reserve force will be sufficient if the Taiwanese troops believe the war is lost the minute it begins.
