The clear implication of the RAND study is that the F-35 is very likely to wind up facing many more “up close and personal” opponents than its proponents suggest, while dealing with beyond-visual-range infrared-guided missiles as an added complication. Unlike the F-22, the F-35 is described as “double inferior” to modern SU-30 family fighters within visual range combat; thrust and wing loading issues are noted, all summed up in one RAND background slide as “can’t [out]turn, can’t [out]climb, can’t [out]run.”
Some critics have said that enemy planes can get close to our F-35s and that when they do they can out-dogfight the F-35. This is something I have worried about. The F-35 will make up the vast majority of our fighter inventory eventually and needs to work. Is the maneuverability problem even a problem? On the surface it seems like the answer must be "yes it is a problem."
But the designers think otherwise. (And let me note that I have a small amount of Lockheed Martin stock) According to their design assumptions:
Rather than entering a turning fight at the merge, the F-35 barrels through and takes an over-the-shoulder defensive shot. As a Northrop Grumman video puts it, "maneuvering is irrelevant".
So the plane constantly looks 360 degrees and the plane does not need to be pointed even in the general direction of the target to fire a missile at it.
I hope it works. But is it safe to assume how our enemies will fight us? The last time we assumed dogfighting was obsolete we got our asses handed to us in the skies over North Vietnam. In the short run, training helped reverse that, and in the long run we developed our current inventory of highly maneuverable fighter planes.
