Since this "decapitation" (of key terrorists) program began in 2008, over 700 terrorists, including two dozen senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, and nearly a hundred mid-level ones, have died from the UAV missile attacks. There have actually been few civilian deaths, as the UAVs stalk their targets, and seek to catch them while travelling, or otherwise away from civilians. Journalists visiting the sites of these attacks later, find few locals claiming lots of civilian casualties.
For all of 2008, there were 36 attacks, causing 317 deaths. The UAV campaign actually began in earnest a year ago. Since then, there have been over sixty attacks. The rate of attacks has been increasing this year. The number of attacks has not increased a lot, but the number of senior terrorist leaders killed has. No wonder that the Taliban leadership is desperate to try anything to stop the Hellfires.
The enemy is trying to exploit Pakistani popular reactions against "violations" of their national sovereignty by simply lying about civilian casualties caused by our strikes to stoke further anger. The Pakistani government has so far withstood the public reaction, knowing that our strikes kill jihadis who are trying to kill Pakistani leaders.
I'm impressed with the staying power of the Pakistani government to support (quietly) the strikes. I'd be more impressed if they could explain why the strikes are good. Otherwise, a government might one day feel too weak to resist popular pressure to halt the attacks. When the strikes started up in earnest in fall 2008, I didn't think the Pakistani government would be this resolute and thought we were doing it anyway to knock back the enemy during a presidential transition period. Obviously, the attacks are continuing--and working.
UPDATE: Of course, some don't like our drone strikes because they are so accurate--which means we'll just be more prone to using them to kill our enemies:
The logic of much of the legal opposition to the use of these weapons, beyond the specifics of the legal arguments in specific circumstances, as has been said to me dozens of times by leading lawyers in the human rights community, academics, and activists, is that the more discriminating the weapon and the less it risks American soldiers in its use, the greater the incentive for it to be used, thus raising the threshold of violence.
And by "some," obviously, I'm not talking about Taliban leaders who live in fear of being vaporized in their daily travels. But don't call them "unpatriotic." Fascinating.
