The State of Iran's Nuclear Plans

Tigerhawk notes a Stratfor analysis of Iran and asserts that evidence shows that Iran isn't as close to nuclear weapons as we think and that the Iran protests have not expanded beyond the upper class urban base.

Stratfor's analysis isn't helped by their dismissal of the Saddam-Niger connection, since my memory of the issue is that there was something there and Joe Wilson's trip provided information to back that claim--not refute it.

While I appreciate Stratfor's analysis and expertise, I don't always buy their conclusions. I don't dismiss them, but I don't just accept them.

Certainly, Stratfor is right that the protests over the election were initially narrowly based. And through the fall they remained that way. It may even be that Stratfor is right and they remain narrowly based, but recent news seems to indicate a broadening opposition to the regime.

And while the regime surely doesn't look like it is teetering, I'm just not sure if it is safe to say the regime is secure. I still think it could go either way.

What bothers me is the Iran nuclear issue. I have no doubt that partisans on both sides of the issue leak material--both true and false. Stratfor may be right that the nuclear trigger news is completely false.

But such an analysis ignores the bigger picture that Iran is on the path to having nuclear weapons. Leaks merely adjust our estimate of where they are along that path. There should be no doubt about where the path leads--Iranian nuclear missiles.

And given our poor track record on figuring out just where countries are in the status of their WMD programs (missing pre-1991 Iraq's progress, missing India and Pakistan in the late 1990s, missing North Korea the last decade, missing Russia's first passing the nuclear threshold, missing Libya's WMD programs, and overstating Iraq's pre-2003 WMD status), you'd think we might be a little less confident of our ability to pinpoint Iran's status with enough accuracy to guide when we think we need to take decisive action.

We know where Iran is going. That should be enough. Let's not try to make it seem a lesser problem by arguing that we have 5 instead of 1 year, or 10 instead of 5 years.