Only a few short years ago, China passed anti-secession legislation making the reconquest of Taiwan seem far more imminent.
Yet the Chinese seek to explain this recent charm offensive as a sign of China's evolving position on Taiwan:
A Chinese economist whose contrarian views have previously caught the leadership's eye has suggested Beijing revise its "one country, two systems" formula for Taiwan and consider a federation or confederation.
The contentious idea for a rethink of China's policy towards self-ruled Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own, is almost certain to trigger a heated debate in the Communist Party, the government and academia.
Most ordinary Chinese buy the government's official line about the inevitable return to the fold for Taiwan, a rival to the mainland since their split in 1949 amid civil war.
"It's one country, two governments," Lu De, the eldest son of the late reform-minded vice-premier Lu Dingyi, told Reuters in a rare interview.
"To resolve the cross-Strait problem, (we) must create new concepts and thinking or else it would give rise to contradictions and chaos in policy, thinking and action," said Lu, a board member of Beijing's semi-official China Council for Promoting Peaceful Reunification.
China and Taiwan signed a landmark deal last week to launch regular flights as politics were put aside in favour of practicalities in their first formal talks in almost a decade.
Nonetheless, Lu called for bold new thinking on how to deal with Taiwan's new President Ma Ying-jeou, who has vowed "not to unify (with China), not to declare independence and not to go to war".
In a deviation from conventional thinking, Lu said the "one country, two systems" formula, under which Hong Kong and Macau reverted to Chinese rule in 1997 and 1999 respectively, was unfit for Taiwan.
Lu is hardly a member of the ruling class. But he is allowed to speak his view. Is there really a debate within China about confederation with Taiwan that grants Taiwan independence in all but name, with separate economic and policital systems sustained by separate governing and military institutions, and ends the longstanding threat of force? Just when China's military is gaining the ability to invade?
Or is this charm offensive far less than hopeful?
Far be it from me to belittle a charm offensive by a regime that has in the past shown no sympathy for Taiwan's continued de facto independence, but might not the Chinese have heard of Sun Tzu? If near, appear far. And who would suspect anything amiss amidst the warm feelings spawned by Taiwanese sympathy for the China earthquake victims and the Chinese charm offensive that suddenly sees no rush to resolving the Taiwan issue.
I predicted a charm offensive would be part of a pre-war campaign to lull Taiwan, the United States, and the world prior to striking Taiwan, just part of the plan to conquer Taiwan:
Surprise will be important. The Taiwanese military has problems but it is far from toothless. And US and Japanese naval and air power are capable of defeating the Chinese at sea and in the air. With tensions high over the obviously increased Chinese military capabilities and their long history of saying that Taiwan must be absorbed into China, a nice charm offensive will be in order to lull potential enemies. In late 2007, China could initiate or accept more cross-Strait talks on various issues. They might even—in the spirit of the Olympics—suggest talks on how to have the Taiwan athletes march in the opening ceremonies. Perhaps behind a symbolic contingent of all Chinese marching under the PRC flag, the remaining Chinese athletes will march in under flags of their home provinces, so the Taiwanese could march under the Taiwanese flag. Whatever the details, the point will be that the warm fuzzy of the Olympics will be used to create a false thaw after years of tension.
The first link above about the anti-secession legislation quotes a Chinese official who specified that force would be the last resort after peaceful methods for reunification are exhausted. If the extraordinary level of Chinese soft-talk fail to persuade Taiwan to accept reunification even under terms that on the surface appear generous, would that signify under Chinese law that peaceful means are exhausted?
Is it too much for Taiwanese to hope that China is abandoning their longstanding threat to conquer Taiwan? After enduring such a threat looming over their tiny nation for so long, reaching out for this hope surely reflects human nature to believe a happy ending is possible. To believe in the basic goodness of foes who are just like them may suppress caution to a dangerous degree in Taiwan.
We can see what China is doing. They are being very nice. And after more than a decade of building up forces capable of attacking Taiwan, which is not noted so much these days. The question is, why are they doing all this?
