By 1993, when it was time for me to decide whether to reenlist, I could see that already the Guard was being used more and more to supplement the active component forces for routine foreign deployments. So I had to choose whether I wanted to be a semi-regular when my career and family path weren't going to allow me to pursue higher rank. Did I really want to end my days in the Guard as an E-4 with several deployments to peacekeeping operations under my belt? So I didn't reenlist.
Indeed, in 1995, as it became clear that we were heading for Bosnia, I figured that as a member of the Individual Ready Reserve, I still had a chance of being called up.
So I have both sympathy for the soldier discussed in this article and a little bit of confusion over how as late as 2000 he could think that getting mobilized was unlikely:
Herrera, then 21, took the oath to defend his country in 2000 — but it may as well have been a generation ago considering how much has changed for the citizen-soldiers.
"I thought, 'This is the National Guard.' If there are riots or fires, fine, but I figured at least I'd never see combat."
But the Guard and Reserves currently make up more than 20 percent of the U.S. force in Iraq and account for about 18 percent of the more than 3,800 soldier deaths since 2003. Iraq has redefined — perhaps permanently — the roles for fighters and their families in what once was viewed as a force of last resort.
"This is the biggest call-up since World War II, there's no question about it," said retired Brig. Gen. Stephen K. Koper, president of the Washington-based National Guard Association, which represents about 40,000 members.
"The requirement was always there," he added. "It wasn't always executed, but it was always there. Joining a reserve component on the basis that no one's been called in quite a while is clearly a roll of the dice. If one is concerned about that, one shouldn't join."
His experience demonstates on an individual level the problem that changing the reserve components (of which the Guard is only one part) from a strategic reserve called to war only for a big war (or for short times for domestic problems like storms or civil disturbance) to an operational reserve that supplements the active components regularly and fights alongside the regulars.
Even in 1990-1991, the transition was only partial since no Guard combat brigades went to the Middle East for Desert Storm. Basically, only support units went to war.
But in 2003, Guard combat units were in the first wave assisting the invasion forces led by the regulars. And in 2004, Guard combat units held a large section of the "front" (as active units restructured to the new Brigade Combat Team organization) and endured the enemy counter-offensive in spring 2004.
And for the future, the Guard will be expected to routinely make available 5-6 brigades combat teams each year plus support units.
How will we attract recruits to what is becoming a semi-regular force? Active duty troops will be on call once every third year while reservists will be on call once every sixth year. Yet the active troops will have better pay and benefits as well as better career prospects. Reservists will interrupt their careers for a pittance to fight only half as often.
And once home, reservists who are more vulnerable to PTSD than active troops, won't have the support structure of the military all around them to recover.
Herrera is on his second deployment to Iraq, this time at Camp Victory. Given the reality of the commitment, I'm stunned that so many still enlist and reenlist in the reserves. And let me point out that Herrera reenlisted before he was sent back. I don't blame him for not wanting to do another tour as infantry. But he did go back as a radio repairman.
This is a major change in how we will use our reservists. I never saw any kegs during my drills. Even former active component troops new to our unit thought we were as professional as AC units.
But I do know that for some units in some states, the Guard was a social club more than a combat force. Nowadays, that social opportunity could likely be in the Camp Victory Enlisted Club. And getting men like Herrera to enlist and reenlist in the reserves will be a challenge. Such men and women are out there, as our current recruiting success indicates. But in the long run, we need a compensation package that recognizes their new status as semi-active troops and not true reservists.
