As I've argued, we need Local Defense Forces in Iraq as the first line of defense (well, second if you call good intelligence and recon the first line):
Could we form local defense forces and then recruit out of the militias? Pay them, equip them, lead them, and supervise them?
We don't want the Shia death squads. We need the Shias to defend themselves. But we don't want forces loyal to Iran or Sadr doing the protecting. And we sure as heck don't need to be blamed for every jihadi car bomb that goes off in a Shia neighborhood because Shias believe we won't let them defend themselves.We need Local Defense Forces in Iraq. And peeling militia members away from Sadr is the way to build such a force.
Well, at least with the Sunni Arabs, we're getting them and they are working. This is what the defections of Sunni Arabs means:
This improvement, like the others, has been largely effected by volunteers who are now taking an active role in the establishment and maintenance of security in their neighborhoods. Some are former insurgents; all are unpaid. Still, according to the U.S. military, they are swearing their loyalty to the Iraqi government and openly repudiating al Qaeda.
And this concept must be broadened to Shias as I've advocated. While we can decry the Iranian-influenced Shias who acted as death squads, the bulk of Sadr's militias really were protecting their neighborhoods. We need to split these local defense forces from the thugs in the pay of Persians. Lieutenant General Odierno explains this aspect:
ASKED about Muqtada al-Sadr, Odierno responded: "He's a figurehead . . . erratic in his behavior . . . unpredictable. . . but he's the individual who reaches out to the Shia nobody else reaches out to. The problem is that he's lost control of some parts of his movement, the Special Groups and others - many of whom are funded by Iran.
"We need to separate those elements and kill or capture them - while working with those closer to the mainstream."
As for the militias that have alternately plagued Iraq and protected the people along sectarian lines, the general is convinced that "we must deal with the militia problem. . . Wherever possible, they'll have to be integrated into the security forces."
Local defense forces work. Properly screened, supervised, and supported, we will have a nation-in-arms hostile to insurgents and terrorists, tripping up and identifying the enemy whenever they try to move, and drawing in deadly conventional ground and air forces to pursue them and kill them.
