One official who was sent the briefing slides for various surge options said he was struck with the lack of new ideas after an intense three-month review process inside the Bush administration. "Some of this stuff is what the old Coalition Provisional Authority looked at," said the official, referring to the U.S. government organization that ran Iraq from 2003 to 2004.
I think we are winning in Iraq (though far more slowly since summer 2006--perhaps too slowly to sustain our war effort) and worry failure of the surge would be used as an excuse by even war supporters to pack our bags and come home. I don't know why we must surge troops when we could surge an effort.
John Keegan supports a surge and I have to take his judgment seriously:
The object of the surge deployment should be to overwhelm the insurgents with a sudden concentration, both of numbers, armoured vehicles and firepower with the intention to inflict severe losses and heavy shock. The Mahdi Army in Sadr City should prove vulnerable to such tactics, which would of course be supported by helicopters and fixed-wing aviation.
Hitherto most military activity by coalition forces has been reactive rather than unilateral. Typically, units have become involved in fire fights while on patrol or on convoy protection duties. During the surge, the additional troops would take the fight to the enemy with the intention of doing him harm, destabilising him and his leaders and damaging or destroying the bases from which he operates.
So am I wrong to oppose a surge?
One, Keegan calls for a specific mission: taking down Sadr. This is a mission that could be worth it, though I worry that Sadr has built up enough popularity to make it dangerous to surge combat troops for the mission. Nonethless, I've said a surge for specific measurable missions is absolutely appropriate. We've done so in the past.
But I don't understand how surging combat brigades as Keegan advocates will help. Are we to assault the Shia slums of Baghdad?
If we surge an effort aimed at Sadr rather than surging troops--perhaps limiting ourselves to a single extra combat brigade, plus Rangers and special forces types--a limited surge of conventional forces as part of a focused effort would be of use. But I don't see how we'd use five more brigades against Sadr unless there is a general uprising of his Mahdi Army. Besides, we are already quietly going after Sadr, according to Strategypage, without a surge:
Without much fanfare, much less a press release, the government and Coalition troops have gone to war with Moqtada al Sadrs Mahhi Army militia. Leaders are being arrested or killed. The raids are being carried out with overwhelming speed and force, so that pro-Sadr gunmen have little chance to put up effective resistance.
The current thinking from AEI is that we pacify Baghdad to protect the people. But while I have no doubt that while we are there we can do some good, a surge by definition must end. We will have strained our military for nothing, achieved nothing lasting, and perhaps undermined Iraqi efforts to take over security.
Really, I've seen no mission articulated that seems good enough to strain our military in a surge. Since I think we are--broadly speaking--winning, I'd hate to make a big and pointless effort that leaves us more willing to give up.
And all that talk about how we'd have six months to make it work makes me worry even more about this outcome. Those on the pro-war side who speak of giving the war six more months to work are just as bad as the advocates of retreat in encouraging our enemies. There is nothing magic about the next six months--or whenever you start the countdown. If we haven't made visible progress over those next six months, the next step is to try something else!
We must be in this war to win. Let there be no more talk of redeployments or "one last effort."
Let's discuss victory and what we need to do to win.
