Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said 400 fighters from a key backer of the Shiite-led government have been arrested, and a government spokesman said Thursday the U.S. is not giving Iraqi security forces enough money for training and equipment. Al-Maliki's claim sought to address doubts about his willingness to take on the Shiite militiamen, especially the Mahdi army that is loyal to his key supporter, the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Many of the militiamen are believed responsible for much of the sectarian violence in Baghdad in the past year.
This might be merely 0.67% of the total and they are easily replaced. Worse, picking up the low ranking gunmen just risks spreading the pain--and anger--among lots of Shias.
Although going after Sadr and related militias is necessary, we can't do it in a manner that alienates too many Shias:
U.S. commanders have signaled they will shy away from a Fallujah-style assault on the Baghdad stronghold of Iraq's biggest Shiite militia — even though President Bush insists that driving armed groups from the capital is key to his plan for success.
The talk from the Bush administration has been tough, with strong assurances that no part of Baghdad is off limits to the new push for control.
But in reality, the risk of killing civilians and outraging the Iraqi government may be too high to launch an all-out attack on the Mahdi Army of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in its base of the capital's sprawling Sadr City district — at least for now.
Instead, U.S. commanders are likely first to try options that are politically less risky, such as raids targeting key Mahdi figures, or raids aimed at curbing the militia's spread across other parts of Baghdad.
"I think there's several ways — several options," to try to rein in the al-Sadr group, the top U.S. ground commander, Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, told Fox News this week. "One of them could be going into Sadr City. But that is not one that I would say we would probably do first."
Like I've written, we can't afford to lose the Shias.
But since Sadr must go, we should use targetted raids on the leadership to decapitate the hard core killers. Others who are really just interested in protecting Shia communities rather than killing random Sunnis could be brought under the umbrella of the government security forces by recognizing them as official part-time militias (with government oversight).
And it seems like our leaders know that an assault on Sadr City is not in order. I expect a quiet surge that targets Sadr even as our visible surge protects mixed Baghdad neighborhoods. Will this be the beginning of this quiet surge?
The Mahdi Army commanders said they were increasingly concerned about improved U.S. intelligence that has allowed the Americans to successfully target key figures in the militia.
"We're no longer using cell phones except in emergencies. Some of our top commanders have not been home (in Sadr City) for a year because they fear capture," one of the commanders said.
Apparently, we've already picked up five mid-level leaders in the months leading up to today.
The pace will need to pick up. And I wonder if there will be public announcements of reasonable militia leaders defecting to the government.
UPDATE: Getting closer:
U.S. and Iraqi forces arrested one of Muqtada al-Sadr's top aides Friday in Baghdad, his office said, as pressure increased on the radical Shiite cleric's militia ahead of a planned security crackdown in the capital.
Sadr isn't the only problem. But he'll do for a start.
ANOTHER UPDATE: Ah, and we've already started (Tip to Weekly Standard blog) on the biggest part of the problem:
The U.S. military has launched a special operations task force to break up Iranian influence in Iraq, according to U.S. News sources. The special operations mission, known as Task Force 16, was created late last year to target Iranians trafficking arms and training Shiite militia forces. The operation is modeled on Task Force 15, a clandestine cadre of Navy SEALs, Army Delta Force soldiers, and CIA operatives with a mission to capture or kill al Qaeda operatives and Baathist insurgents in Iraq.
Task Force 15 killed al Qaeda's leader in Iraq, Abu Musab Zarqawi, last June.
The new classified directive is part of an escalation of military countermeasures against Iran, authorized by President Bush, to strike back at what military officials describe as a widespread web of Iranian influence in Iraq that includes providing weapons, training, and money to Shiite militias.
Like I said, surge an effort.
