Al Anbar Province is essentially the power base of the Baathists and jihadis who seek to disrupt the major population centers of central Iraq around Baghdad. It must be dealth with.
This article (via Real Clear Politics) says that the enemy has fought us to a stalemate in this province:
Insurgents in Anbar province, the center of guerrilla resistance in Iraq, have fought the U.S. military to a stalemate.
After repeated major combat offensives in Fallujah and Ramadi, and after losing hundreds of soldiers and Marines in Anbar during the past two years - including 75 since June 1 - many American officers and enlisted men assigned to Anbar have stopped talking about winning a military victory in Iraq's Sunni Muslim heartland. Instead, they're trying to hold on to a handful of population centers and hit smaller towns in a series of quick-strike operations designed to disrupt insurgent activities temporarily.
"I don't think of this in terms of winning," said Col. Stephen Davis, who commands a task force of about 5,000 Marines in an area of some 24,000 square miles in the western portion of Anbar. Instead, he said, his Marines are fighting a war of attrition. "The frustrating part for the (American) audience, if you will, is they want finality. They want a fight for the town and in the end the guy with the white hat wins."
That's unlikely in Anbar, Davis said. He expects the insurgency to last for years, hitting American and Iraqi forces with quick ambushes, bombs and mines.
A couple months ago, in a press conference about the area, the Marine general gave the numbers of the troops he had to fight the enemy in al Anbar. The numbers were low given the population of the area and I could see that real pacification was not possible with those numbers. I meant to blog on it but other topics intruded. In part, it didn't seem high priority since our attention was then just starting to focus on the area, and so it seemed that more troops could flow to the area as Iraqis took over security duties from American forces in central Iraq.
The situation in al Anbar does worry me. In Saddam's time it was beyond his control but it did not send jihadis to Baghdad to fight his regime. Today, as long as the tribes of the region support the jihadis or look the other way, this area will be a bleeding wound for Iraq. The press never made much of this lack of control under Saddam but will note it as a failure of the new Iraq, so it is a problem. If the terrorists can fan out to disrupt the elections, this will be a problem.
Oh, this won't stop Iraq from standing up a new government, mind you. I don't think the Baathists and jihadis can actually beat the government--stalemate works both ways, after all. And the stalemate, if the reporter is right, is only in the field. Behind the shield of this battlefiled stalemate the government gets stronger and so will in time be able to exert more force in the field to break the stalemate.
And our efforts to disrupt the jihadis and get them busy fighting in al Anbar rather than just being in a relatively safe rear area to funnel bombers to within ear shot of Western reporters holed up in Baghdad hotels is progress, too. If we can get Iraqi border posts up and running in an honest and effective manner, we can choke off the flow of jihadis into al Anbar somewhat. If we could stop Syrian support that would really help reduce the flow, of course. If we can pry more tribes to the side of the government, we will reduce the wild west nature of the region and make it more friendly to the government and reduce the places where the enemy can cross into Iraq, hide, and plan.
All these steps will reduce the threat and make it easier for Iraqi forces to cope. So our efforts are not wasted. Without them the enemy would be too strong for the generally green Iraqi security forces to handle. Rocked back on their heels and on the defensive, the new Iraqi units will have a better chance of success.
Without locals willing to fight for Iraq in sufficient numbers, we will have to wait for the anti-infiltration measures to be carried out and for the creation of sufficient trained central government regular troops capable of being sent to the area. If we can get more tribes to side with us, the process of eliminating the enemy will be speeded up but this takes time, too.
In the meantime we will probably shift troops west as Iraqis consolidate the central areas and free up our troops for offensive operations. This at least keeps the enemy off balance and reduces their focus on heading east to hit the population centers due to the need to watch out for what we are doing to them.
This is a hard region to control and so don't expect too much from our troops in the area. Even with a large increase in forces it would be a tough fight that would require the other factors I listed in order to pacify the region. Disrupting the enemy is probably all we can do for now.
Heck, don't expect too much from the Iraqis when they replace us out there. Saddam had to compromise with the locals. So too will the new Iraq buy off the tribes to settle the region down.
So while I have some worries about the area, I think it is wrong to talk of stalemate and defeat. It is also wrong to compare the situation to Vietnam. But journalists have been incorrectly comparing American military actions to Vietnam since about the Tet Offensive (Funny how a comparison that is based on incorrect analysis of the original can live on for decades. Not funny in the humorous sense, of course).
Patience, oh chattering class, have patience.
