Yeah, pity we got rid of that force for stability, Saddam Hussein. And if Bush didn't put enough troops in to win the post-war (demonstrably false since we did win after about 4 years of fighting insurgents and terrorists) , why didn't President Obama learn a lesson and bust a gut to keep forces in Iraq after 2011?
But let's review the history of jihadis in Iraq (again):
Our liberation of Iraq did not cause the jihadi problem in Iraq. Al Qaeda invaded Iraq after we destroyed Saddam's regime. Arguing that we caused the jihadis in Iraq is like arguing that our invasion of Italy in 1943 caused the Nazis to occupy Italy.
Further, before April 2003, the jihadis had an ally in Baghdad because America was their common enemy. Why would al Qaeda have invaded an ally? And before 2001, why would al Qaeda leave their Afghanistan sanctuary? And remember that Saddam Hussein hosted his own jihadi corps. Jihadis have thrived in Iraq since the mid-1990s. The nature of the jihadis has changed over time, but their presence is nothing new.
Funny enough, during the war the Left liked to deny that al Qaeda was in Iraq at all--in order to justify losing that war. Remember when the "real" war was in Afghanistan?
Regardless, we beat the jihadis (and Iran's hand puppets) in Iraq by the time President Obama came into office. As the situation in Iraq deteriorated after our president walked away from Iraq in 2011, I begged the administration on this blog to re-engage. But, no. And here we are.
And if our invasion caused jihadis to enter Iraq (not true, in any case), we stayed out of Syria.
Why are there so many more jihadis in Syria than there were in Iraq when we were there?
Why are there so many jihadis in Libya when we simply deposed the leader but kept our troops out?
Heck, why were there jihadis in Afghanistan prior to 9/11 long before we were there?
We do not cause jihadis. In a perfect world, we kill them wherever we find them. Even if they inconveniently go to Iraq.
After more than 6 years as president, Barack Obama has learned little.