So what will Russia do under these circumstances?
Five weeks of Russian inspired separatist violence in eastern Ukraine has left over 130 dead so far and the fighting continues. Russian plans to annex eastern Ukraine (the Donbas region) are not working as they did in Crimea. In Donbas the locals as well as the Ukrainian government are fighting back. The Russian supported separatists are outnumbered and in danger of being crushed. Russia cannot really afford a defeat like this, but is faced with growing anger in Ukraine and around the world. Russia makes light of Western sanctions over the Ukraine meddling, but the economic damage to Russia is already being done and there is nothing Russia can do to halt that short of getting out of Ukraine. ...
In eastern Ukraine the Russian plan to seize control of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (province) is falling apart. ...
While the armed pro-Russian separatists have been fighting back when they encounter Ukrainian troops they are less eager to open fire on local pro-Ukrainian militias. This is troubling news for Russia which now has to fear a guerilla war if it seizes Donbas. The old Soviet Union was brutal and will organized enough to deal with Ukrainian guerillas after World War II, although that fighting lasted into the 1950s. Post-Soviet Russia is much less able to deal with a popular rebellion against Russian rule. ...
[Russia's 40,000] troops [facing Ukraine] are better trained and equipped than they were in 2008 when Russia invaded tiny (a tenth the size of Ukraine) Georgia. Since then Russia has increased its defense spending, on average, at least ten percent a year. Ukrainian troops are less well trained and equipped, but they are angry at this Russian aggression and that may make a difference if it comes to a fight.
There's a lot more. Read it all, as the saying goes.
As I noted, I tend to think the economic hits (which are real) will fade as people get back to business once the crisis settles down, one way or the other. Organized sanctions against smaller countries (are Iran, North Korea, and Cuba changing their ways? Did Saddam's Iraq under sanctions?) have had little effect on policies and I don't think weak sanctions on a large, nuclear-armed country will do more than signal our outrage in the long run.
I think that the chances of Russia getting a cheap win like in Crimea are fading. Russia will soon have to decide whether to invade eastern Ukraine or go home. Will Ukraine's May 25 election signal Putin's last chance to invade?
And while Russia could march into eastern Ukraine (and even deeper), I have strong doubts that Russia could pacify the region short of Chechnya Rules. We should be helping Ukraine in this regard (big ticket items are pointless given the time it takes to equip and train, although when the crisis dies down, Ukraine could sure use some spare A-10s that our Air Force is bizarrely eager to discard).
And if Ukrainian anger keeps them in the fight and Russia fails to destroy Ukraine's army in that initial campaign, a Ukrainian Ulcer could bleed Russia badly and deny Russia an easy victory that they need to prove Russia is a major military power.
Russia would be smart to settle for their Crimea victory and count on Western relief that Russia didn't pursue more right now. But I freely admit that my view of rational may not be how Putin views the situation.
