Saturday, October 19, 2013

The Obvious Compromise

Iran entered yet another round of talks about a nuclear weapons program they deny they have.

The futility of the talks should be apparent by Iran's opening gambit:

Iran says it is not interested in such weapons and is offering a proposal meant to dispel such fears. In return it expects the easing of crippling international sanctions on its economy.
Iran's objective is clear:

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is lying when he says the Islamic Republic has never had any intention of building an atomic weapon. Defecting Iranian nuclear engineers told U.S. officials in the late 1980s that the mullahs’ program, then hidden, was designed exclusively for such arms. Everything Western intelligence services have tracked since then matches those early revelations. ...

The administration and Congress are gambling that sanctions will be enough to overcome the regime’s chronic dishonesty. Economic pain will be so intense, the theory holds, that eventually Tehran will play by Western rules.

In other words, supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Revolutionary Guards and Rouhani — who had a not-insignificant role in developing Iran’s nuclear program in the 1990s — would be willing to admit that “evil incarnate” (Khamenei’s update to the “Great Satan”), against which the Islamic Republic’s very identity has been built, has defeated their nuclear aspirations.

Every country has an economic breaking point. But achieving that moment in the Islamic Republic will be extraordinarily difficult because such compromise is tantamount to spiritual suicide.

So Iran won't give up their nuclear weapons to get sanctions relief.

Iran, which as a mullah republic can't even remember the day when they weren't under sanctions, has tremendous experience in circumventing (although there is only so much that can be done when the sanctions tighten enough), no doubt believes they can cope until the sanctions end.

Sanctions could end from fear if Iran goes nuclear or from anger if Iran can convince enough countries to pressure America to end the sanction because the economic pain is too much for the people of Iran to bear.

There is danger for us, of course, in believing sanctions can break Iran's will to go nuclear. Given that Iran really wants nuclear weapons--and considers mastering nuclear technology their "right"--it is perhaps likely that any sanctions tough enough to crush Iran's economy to the extent that abandoning a mission from Allah to go nuclear could be seen as an excuse to give in to overwhelming force will instead be seen as an equivalent to an act of war against Iran that will require an armed response:

Sanctions as a means of compelling a nation to do something don't have a good track record of success. The idea of sanctions is that they are an alternative to war.

But if sanctions don't bite enough, the target endures and does not change their behavior. So far Iran is enduring and still going nuclear, supporting terrorism, and backing Assad.

If sanctions hurt enough to make Iran ponder changing course, Iran is more likely to think of sanctions as an act of war rather than an alternative to war. Think Japan after our oil embargo but before Pearl Harbor.

In that post, I wonder if the United Arab Emirates would be a target for Iran under those circumstances. The UAE is heavily invested in supporting rebels in Syria and is conveniently close yet not so big (so Iran may think) that America would automatically intervene like we would over a threat to Saudi Arabia.

But is it far-fetched for Iran to assume they can have both?

Perhaps not:

News reports say the Obama administration is considering gradually unfreezing some of Iran's overseas funds to ease the pain of sanctions aimed at curbing the country's nuclear program.

The proposal would reportedly free up Iran's assets in installments.

The reports - citing unnamed senior administration officials - come after talks in Geneva this week over Iran's disputed nuclear program that White House spokesman Jay Carney said showed "a level of seriousness and substance" from Iran that has not been seen before.

Already, the idea of ending real sanctions in exchange for "concessions" by Iran that we can pretend are significant is being floated.

Oh sure, the administration denies this and says that easing on sanctions will require real and transparent Iranian actions.

But just in case the Obama administration struggles with whether Congress should stand in the way of a proper diplomatic triumph built on the foundation of dismantling sanctions:

Republican senators say they will defy President Obama and push for a bill to toughen sanctions against Iran despite White House objections that any new legislation should wait until after the current round of talks run their course.

The coming confrontation could impact whether Iran's nuclear program can be curtailed through talks that restarted this week in Geneva instead of military action.

But those Republicans don't even believe in hope and change! Why listen to them? The stakes are high! War or peace!

And it isn't Iran's lying, nutballery, support for terrorism, and relentless pursuit of nukes that tips the balance in that choice, but Republican willingness to show good faith by letting the administration offer concessions!

Remember, the tough talk about what Iran must do (and after multiple American deadlines to Iran and the Assad "must go" debacle, why would Iran believe "must" is anything but a wink and a nod?) is all part of the "pretending to believe Iran is sincere" process. As George Costanza told Jerry, "It's not a lie if you believe it."



God help us, but the obvious compromise taking shape is that we'll believe we struck a real deal with Iran by believing any obvious lie that Iran is willing to tell us to reach that deal. John Kerry will think he deserves a Nobel Peace Prize for that document.

And given the track record of the prize in rewarding idiocy and retreat, he just might deserve it.