This isn't really a control map. But a map of force strength. Red is Assad. Blue is rebel (all types). Yellow is Kurdish (effectively rebel). the purplish is red-blue striping that indicates main areas being contested.
You can see why I've long held that Assad's best chance is in a Rump Syria that extends from the coast inland to the north-south highway that goes through Homs.
Extending government strength south to Damascus is a stretch. Although as long as Assad hopes to be called the president of Syria he will want to control the capital. It would be interesting if the Syrian government transfers their capital to the coast, to say the least.
And extending government strength north to Aleppo is a stretch, too. Losing Syria's largest city is too much of a hit at this point, for Assad to readily give up.
(Oddly, the map indicators for Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs--as well as Qusair--didn't save with the rest of the map. You may need to click on the BBC link if you need a reminder on their locations.)
And the far east is just mostly abandoned except for outposts they can hold and efforts to keep ground routes of supply to Iraq open.
If there was a rebel high command and I was in charge, I'd try to reduce the eastern outposts as a priority.
Large sections of barren terrain in the southeast is just not a battlefield.
Extending Assad's strength into the rebel areas will be a hard job given the rebel strength and government losses. Unless the rebels lose heart--and it seems early in the rebellion for that to happen, although Assad clearly hopes the chemical arms deal will do just that be denying rebels hope of American air support--just holding the western parts of Syria in a triangle from the Alawite coast northeast to Aleppo and then south to Damascus seems like too big a job to me. Only massive Iranian support with Russian ammo and weapons have allowed Assad to hold on this long.
Assad's forces have taken a beating and they rely on outside support to continue the fight:
Despite the high desertion rate in the Syrian military, the government has replaced these losses with militias formed from their core supporters (Alawites and other religious minorities like Christians and Druze). Iran is key in making this happen, as they have trainers (from the Quds Force) with experience in organizing these types of militias (especially in Iraq). Iran also provides cash to pay many of the militiamen. It’s only a part-time job (guarding their neighborhoods as well as checkpoints and military bases in the area) but the economy is a mess and a little cash means a lot. The rebels have gotten some similar aid from foreign allies (mainly Arab oil states) and the West but not to the extent that Russia and Iran have.
The Syrian military has suffered heavy equipment losses. Some 2,000 armored vehicles have been destroyed, abandoned, or captured. Same with over 200 aircraft and helicopters. Huge quantities of ammo and small arms have gone the same way. Some rebels have grabbed so many armored vehicles (as well as ammo for their weapons and maintenance facilities and gear) that they are asking the countries that support them for more training on how to use these tanks, self-propelled artillery, and armored personnel vehicles.
The losses have made new supplies of weapons and ammo from Russia and Iran essential. This aid is keeping the Syrian Air Force operational, although most of the bombing attacks are purely terror, with aircraft dropping bombs in towns and neighborhoods known to be pro-rebel.
The Islamic radical groups are becoming more aggressive against the moderate rebels because most of the new weapons (most provided by Arab oil states) are deliberately being kept from the Islamic radical groups. In response, the Islamic radical rebels are increasingly taking “their share” of these weapons and supplies by force.
It is interesting that the militias are now mostly guarding static posts. That always made more sense to me, but in the summer the reports were that the militias were replacing the long-gone infantry and that the militias were taking heavy losses.
But now--especially as part timers--they are static defensive forces mostly and largely immobile strategically.
If the recent government victory south of Damascus that I noted is an indicator, Assad has moved on from using domestic militias (who don't have a population base to replace the losses they appeared to be taking) to replace his infantry to using foreign Shia volunteers as his cannon fodder.
Although I have trouble believing there are 60,000 foreigner Shias fighting for Assad in Syria right now, as the article I linked to in that post states.
Also, note that all our hand-wringing about sending weapons only to properly vetted rebels has been kind of a waste. Now the jihadis are simply taking weapons from more reliable rebels. We should have flooded the rebels with weapons long ago, excluding weapons we didn't want to leak over to jihadi rebels. Although interesting enough, we don't need to think of sending old armored vehicles since the rebels have captured so many that they are asking for training in their use. Apparently, tankers haven't been defecting from Assad's army. Perhaps they were kept in Alawite hands.
The war goes on. And casualties continue to mount, rivaling in only 2-1/2 years the 8 years of casualties in Iraq while our troops were present.
