Early on, I figured Assad lacked the troops to do more than hold an arc of territory in the west from the Turkish border at the coast (excluding Aleppo), through Homs and Damascus, and down to the Israeli and Jordanian borders along the main north-south highway.
As time went on, I've come to doubt whether Assad can hold Damascus and points south. Assad's fight for Aleppo made that troop:people ratio to low, in my view, worse.
That survival strategy is getting more attention:
Middle East analysts have been speculating in recent weeks about the various ways the 28-month-old civil war in Syria might come to an end. One scenario mentioned often is that the warring factions will divide the country into separate ethnic or religious enclaves that reflect Syria’s diversity and settlement patterns.
And key to any such a scenario, according to the analysts, is creation of an enclave along Syria’s Mediterranean coast for the Alawites, adherents to an offshoot of Shiite Islam followed by President Bashar al-Assad and a majority of the ruling elite in Damascus.
The Assad regime is said to have been fortifying what is becoming known as “Alawistan” for months, with help from Russia and Iran.
Economic survival is a problem, and in the short run Assad's Alawistan would need Iranian and possibly Russian financial subsidies. In the long run, off-shore gas deposits might be a source of sufficient revenue.
Assad might also get pipeline transit fees for even the Sunni areas that wish to export the oil they control in more eastern parts of Syria. And perhaps new pipelines beyond Syria.
The article also notes that Assad plans to build an airport near Tartus on the coast. That would be necessary if Assad abandons Damascus.
Assad rebuilt his ground strength, somewhat, with a lot of new militias. He'd be better off saving them to hold his smaller realm rather than burn them up trying to retake Syria from the rebels. If Assad loses too many militia and lacks a military with the numbers or morale to hold their ground, retreating to an Alawistan will just be an interim step in his full retreat and total defeat.
If Assad wants, he can burn up the Hezbollah expeditionary force in counter-attacks to secure the core Alawistan that Assad might like to control when the guns fall silent (from formal ceasefire or exhaustion). Why wouldn't Assad fight to the last Hezbollah fighter?
If Assad gets his Alawistan, we should not consider the war against Assad's regime over. Post-Syria Assad still allied with Iran, supplied by Russia, and with access to Lebanon, will be just as dangerous to regional peace.
