But opponents of hurting Assad continue to defend their nuanced thinking. Holding that a year of debate before invading Iraq in 2003, following 11 years of trying to make a ceasefire after the 1991 war contain Iraq, was a "rush to war," two years of dithering while our president says "Assad must go" is deliberative pondering time.
Funny, those enduring close to 100,000 dead (well, that includes all sides, to be fair) aren't as enamored of our rush to indecision:
Imagine for the moment that you are a Syrian rebel fighter who has been risking his life for two years in the hope that Obama was sincere about helping a moderate opposition prevail not just against Assad but against the jihadists who want to run the country. Now you learn that Washington is having second thoughts. What would you think about America’s behavior?
Let me quote from a message sent by one opposition member: “I am about to quit, as long as there is no light in the end of the tunnel from the U.S. government. At least if I quit, I will feel that I am not part of this silly act we are in.” A second opposition leader wrote simply to a senior U.S. official: “I can’t find the right words to describe this situation other than very sad.”
An angry statement came this week from Gen. Salim Idriss, the head of the moderate Free Syrian Army. After Britain, like the United States, backed away from supplying weapons, he told the Daily Telegraph newspaper: “The West promises and promises. This is a joke now. . . . What are our friends in the West waiting for? For Iran and Hezbollah to kill all the Syrian people?”
Yeah, under this administration it is usually safer to be an enemy than an imperfect friend. Ask Khadaffi who flipped out of fear following the destruction of the Saddam regime in Iraq.
When rebels started fighting Assad, we should have taken this Heaven-sent opportunity to smash Assad who has the blood of many Americans on his hands. But without our aid to secular rebels, jihadis have become the most effective (if not yet most numerous) rebels in Syria. How's that for nuance, eh?
But with Assad shrinking his realm and receiving major support from Russia and Iran (including Hezbollah) who don't fret over Assad's failing, Assad can see hope of surviving in his smaller Syria while rebels dominate the far north, south, and east without sufficient power to drive into the heartland of Rump Syria.
The rebels probably can't take Assad's Rump Syria--at least not for quite some time, at best--as the British say (although Britain's failure to arm rebels might have something to do with that, no?); and Assad can't hope to rule all of Syria, as we say; and in the meantime our 82nd Airborne Division practices seizing loose chemical weapons assets and Cyprus--as I just discovered--prepares to cope with refugees.
We may take so long to decide to fight against Assad that those Syrians fighting against Assad are dead or discouraged. So we'll be compelled to abandon our claim that "Assad must go" or intervene directly to oust Assad with our own troops in order to help refugees, secure chemical arms, and fight the jihadis who famously keep fighting when others (who we'd prefer to deal with) are discouraged.
The best and brightest in our leadership are frightening.
