"There is not a imminent plan to deploy ground forces. This is, in fact, a worst-case scenario," the official said, adding U.S. forces would likely play a role in such a mission.
Two diplomatic sources, also speaking on condition of anonymity, said as many as 50,000 or 60,000 ground forces may be needed if officials' worst fears are realized, plus additional support forces.
If I was Assad, I would absolutely want a robust stockpile of missiles armed with chemical weapons within my rump Alawite state. Assad wouldn't need all of them. But he would need some of them, as well as production assets moved within his shrunken borders.
If we're talking 60,000 troops, I'd guess that Jordan would contribute 10,000, we'd send in under 10,000 (I'd want a brigade of the 101st, a couple Ranger regiments, and as many special forces as I could scrape up), and the Turks providing the bulk of the force with a corps of a couple infantry divisions and separate mechanized, armored, and paratroop brigades.
Other nations--European and Arab (and maybe Israeli?)--would likely contribute special forces for the mission.
My biggest question is whether France, as the former colonial power, would contribute 5,000 or so.
I also wonder if Iraqi Sunnis might send private contingents of militia to help protect their religious brethren just across the border.
Plus as much Western air power as needed. That would be US-dominated and not much of a problem.
The intervention would face three major problems.
One, they couldn't get all the chemical weapons since Assad--unless he just really sucks at advanced planning--would have some in his new kingdom. Would the intervention force move into rump Alawite Syria to secure those weapons? Would Russia beef up their forces in Tartus in a show of support to protect Assad's rump kingdom and to defend their only overseas base?
Two, once the loose chemical weapons and missile delivery systems were secured and removed, there would be a lot of pressure to keep the troops in place to provide security and to keep jihadis from gaining ground there. The bulk of the Syrian rebels might even welcome Turkish troops to do the dirty work of sweeping up the jihadis who helped them defeat the Assad regime.
Three, the Turks will have non-WMD missions right from the start, complicating the primary mission. The Turks will want to send troops into the northeast Kurdish regions to prevent them from declaring independence or becoming a haven for Turkish Kurds fighting the Turkish government.
After WMD sites are secured and the contents shipped out or destroyed in place (after however many months that job takes), the non-US troops might be reflagged as blue helmets (if Russia agrees on the price of tolerating an Assad-led rump Alawite state in exchange for not using their Security Council veto to block that move), to look like it is completely new.
But it would be a step to peacekeeping and a magnet for jihadis. Can the UN withstand that kind of pressure? I doubt it.
