The Russians themselves warned that outside intervention would lead to a wider war.
Lebanon has seen some fighting spill over from Syria, and it might be intensifying:
The death toll from fighting between Sunni Muslims and Alawites in Tripoli climbed to at least 10 [NOTE: and over 100 wounded] overnight, medical sources said on Wednesday, in clashes that the city's residents described as some of the heaviest since Lebanon's civil war.
There is suspicion that this spill over isn't just happening as a natural consequence of fighting in Syria:
As Syria’s civil war drags on, the recent arrest of a former Lebanese government minister allied with the Syrian leadership on charges that he planned a campaign of bombings and assassinations has led many in Lebanon to conclude that President Bashar al-Assad is trying to push this fragile country into a sectarian war.
Lebanon is somewhat of a mess of divided loyalties:
I got that map from Juan Cole's site, which I don't find particularly useful (and notice how he doesn't get much attention now that Bush is gone--who knows, perhaps he isn't as bad now that he isn't trying to hammer Bush).
Indeed, one of the reasons I wondered about Assad creating an Alawite Rump Syria plus a buffer to the east is the example of Lebanon. Eastern Lebanon was grafted on to the core Christian coastal zone to give the state some depth.
But Syria never accepted that eastern Lebanon was part of Lebanon. Remember that Syria's occupation zone in Lebanon--originally sanctioned to end the civil war there--ran through much of the non-Christian areas of Lebanon:
Would Assad try to add some north-south depth by annexing northeast Lebanon? Say from a point south of Tripoli on the coast to encompass Christian areas and then inland to Balabakk and then east to the border to incorporate the good road lading to Homs? Would the annexation be informal as Syria's occupation of portions of Lebanon was before? Or done through proxies?
Much depends on how far Assad wants to retreat, what he thinks he needs to rule after that retreat, and what Russia is prepared to do in support.
It's quite possible that Assad really intends to fight for all of Syria and win or lose that battle. But I can't see how he could pull that off successfully.
I admit my speculation on a Core Syria (which no longer seems defensible given the erosion of Assad's security forces), a Rump Alawite Syria, and a Rump + Buffer Syria (and now a Rump/Buffer plus Southern Buffer Syria) is purely a map exercise without analysis of whether any of those are viable as a state. But they have the advantage from Assad's point of view of leaving his people in charge at the end of the day. And if Assad can keep Russian (and Iranian, and to a lesser extent, Chinese) support, he might have no choice but to try one of them.
