Some here are confused, and wish to "accommodate" China:
In The China Choice I argue that America should try to accommodate China’s growing power. I propose that it should be willing negotiate a new regional order in which it continues to play a major strategic role, but not the kind of primacy that it has exercised until now. The main reason is simply that China no longer accepts U.S. primacy as the basis for the Asian order, and that as its power grows to equal and overtake America’s, the chances of successfully imposing primacy on China are too low, and the risks and costs of trying are too high, to be justified.
Oh, China doesn't accept this? Why didn't you say so in the first place? By all means, then, let's explore what the freaking Chinese want! This isn't mere appeasement, you sad little, cloistered rube. The author proposes highly calibrated accommodation to give just enough to keep China from wanting more but not so much that our core interests are sacrificed! See? Nuance.
But I don't think the question we should be answering is what is acceptable to China? Shouldn't the question be what Asian countries want? What about their choices? Are we really supposed to negotiate their fates over their heads by dealing directly with China's dictatorship and cutting deals at the expense of our friends? Really? Thumb up or down? You live and you die? You remain free and you are absorbed? This is where we draw our defense line in Asia and everything outside it is on its own?
We aren't trying to impose primacy on China. Heck, they seem to be doing just fine working within the system we built and defend. We are trying to defend friends and defend our interests. Their choice of who they want to be friends with--and who they worry about--should be the issue, not the People's Republic of China whims.
To that end, AirSea Battle doctrine is not a plan to attack China. We're not eager to take on Iran, does anyone think we are truly eager to go to war with China? No, AirSea Battle is an insurance policy that makes sure China faces too many nations that value their independence and freedom to intimidate or conquer:
The debate over AirSea Battle swirls mostly around technology and whether the doctrine is aimed at China. To answer the latter question first: Yes, it is about China. It has to be.
This is no prophecy of doom. From a political standpoint, war with China is neither inevitable nor all that likely. But military people plan against the most formidable capabilities they may encounter. And from an operational standpoint, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) presents the sternest “anti-access” challenge of any prospective antagonist. Either strategists, planners and warfighters prepare for the hardest case, or the United States must write off important regions or options.
And do not become confused. "Accommodating" China means writing off important regions--and potentially hundreds of millions of people who might not enjoy being written off.
And even in war, AirSea Battle is not a recipe for quick escalation to nuclear war. I've expressed concerns about speculation that we'd need to strike a vast array of targets within China to counter their anti-access forces. The targets are there, but the capabilities we seek to build can be used for many things at times or our choosing--or not:
We applaud the Air-Sea Battle component as the most effective means of preparing for the most challenging conflict—full-scale conventional war. We propose, however, an intermediate strategy, one providing American leadership additional flexibility to avert the need to exercise the potentially escalatory strikes that the Air-Sea Battle strategy may require. Predicated on American relative strengths, particularly in the undersea domain, it is a “war at sea” strategy.
A war-at-sea strategy’s purpose is to provide U.S. political leadership less intrusive ways to deter war and inspire allied engagement in peace. It is a maritime strategy confining conflict to the sea without land invasion or strike, thereby diminishing the threat of escalation. The strategy affords leadership the means to reinforce any relationship between the United States and China, whether cooperation, competition, confrontation, conflict short of war, or war. In this short article we describe the ends, ways, and means of the strategy, why its adoption provides more options for deterrence, and how it plays to American strengths.
In short, AirSea Battle does not have to mean that we focus everything on enabling our carrier task forces to operate close to China. Depending on circumstances, nuclear attack submarines, long range air power, and small combatants from our fleet and allied fleets could operate forward in the western Pacific and frustrate China's ability to control their nearby seas or deny us access to those seas with relevant assets.
Our allies don't need us to penetrate China's anti-access/area denial shield with our aircraft carriers. They just need us to penetrate that shield with assets sufficient to help them defend their sovereignty.
What would be more likely to cause war? China with pro-American states near it who wish to preserve their independence? Or client states of the Middle Kingdom compelled to serve Chinese interests? I'm sure the behavior of China's clients (North Korea, Burma, and Cambodia) has no relation to what China might want in others they manage to bring into their orbit, right?
AirSea Battle doctrine--hopefully boosted by a Land component--is the best way to reassure our friends and allies that they don't have to surrender in part or in whole to China in order to save what they can because they are on their own. Let's spend more time thinking about how to accommodate the needs of our friends than the wants of China.
