Options include dividing them into a strategic reserve and an operational reserve with different pay, training and equipment, Gates said. Another possibility might be moving heavy or infantry brigades into the Guard, he said.
This is returning more to the old view of the Guard--but not all the way back.
As we fought two ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the combat units of the National Guard (and a single Reserve battalion) were integrated into the active component to maintain sufficient forces in the field. While the Army was used to plugging in reserve component combat support and combat service support units, using combat units was not part of the plan.
After Vietnam, our military reorganized to make sure that being sent to any major war would require mobilizing reservists for combat support and combat service support functions. Guard brigades provided the third brigade of some of our active divisions and many would have been sent off to Germany in case of war.
When we went to war with Iraq in 1991, the reserve components worked as planned as far as the support units went. The combat brigades of the National Guard were not used, however, with added training meaning that the brigades were not certified as ready until the war was almost over. The Army National Guard wasn't happy with that.
As time went on, our Army National Guard was split into 15 enhanced readiness brigades with more training and resources to be ready for quicker mobilization; and 8 divisions and some odd brigades as a "strategic reserve" that would take a lot of time to be equipped and trained before fighting. They would only be mobilized for war in extreme cases and would be ready quicker than new units could be built from scratch.
The Iraq War of 2003 saw National Guard enhanced brigades mobilized to take part in the war from the start. They were generally broken apart for commitment in battalions or below and not as complete brigades in the invasion, however. But they worked well in their roles.
As the insurgencies raged, we found that we needed Guard units to routinely supplement the active component forces to reduce the stress of repeated deployments. The reserves became an "operational reserve" that had reserve units plugged into rotations like active units. We made plans to reduce the number of Guard combat brigades and focus resources on these brigades to make sure we'd always have 5 or 6 available each year to supplement the active components.
This stressed reservists who were being used in ways nobody expected. And because this was not expected, benefits and treatment of reservists was below that of active component troops. That affected morale of reservists, too, who didn't like being used like active troops but treated like second-class citizens by the institutional Army that didn't have the means or habits to treat them like active forces. Deployment also wore out older Guard equipment and for a time there were lots of stories of how Guard units at home had little equipment to train.
Our reserves were always pretty good compared to reserve forces of other countries--and even compared to active forces of many countries. They suffered mainly from being compared to the excellent US Army active components. A decade of war has made our reserves even better, with new equipment, experience in mobilizing and deploying as larger units, combat experience, and more training.
But winding down Iraq and in time, Afghanistan, means that we won't need to mobilize constantly 60-80,000 Guard and Reserve troops to supplement the active Army forces deployed abroad. Rather than paying the money to keep all our reserve component forces equipped and trained to make sure that they can be mobilized rapidly in emergency to plug right into the active forces, we are returning to an earlier state.
The strategic reserve would be composed of units that would need a year or two before being sent to war. They'd need to be brought up to strength in personnel strength, equipment, and training. But they'd know that their only expected role would be in disaster relief or civil unrest in their home state. This would be basically what our role for our 8 Guard combat brigades was in the 1990s.
Other brigades would be considered part of the operational reserve and routinely called up to supplement the active components. These troops would have more training, be fully staffed, and have better equipment. They'd get better pay and benefits to compensate the troops for being in units expected to be deployed. But we wouldn't need as many as we did at the height of the Iraq War.
But for a while, all our reserves would have the advantage of the gains made in experience through a decade of war. Without money to keep all our reserves up to par, in time our reserves will return to their older state when few combat units are really ready for war and most are not, while support units will continue to supplement the active forces.
When we decide we have to cut military spending, this happens. Before 9/11 the idea of putting the active Army into tiers of readiness to save money was raised, too. Now we want to do it for reservists and eventually we'll do it for active troops the way things are headed. Part of that will be moving active combat units into the Guard where they can be maintained at even lower readiness than merely reducing their readiness status as an active force being housed and paid 365 days a year.
I don't like this. Readiness is the last thing I'd cut. Maintain training and equipment maintenance before all else. I'd rather have good troops with fewer or older equipment that works than shiny new weapons--that might not have the spare parts or maintenance to work--in the hands of troops that aren't proficient in using them.
