A number of things have drawn the ire of otherwise staunch supporters of our military and their leaders in recent weeks: McChrystal’s insistence on the pursuit of counterinsurgency operations rather than kill-and-capture operations; the changes to both force-protection and escalation-of-force procedures that McChrystal has implemented or recommended in Afghanistan; and the rising belief among some that, since President Obama does not seem prepared to do everything they would like to see in the fight against Islamist militancy, we should not support him at all.
I've never bought the idea that Iraq distracted us from Afghanistan. The truth is that through at least 2007, we were doing fine in Afghanistan. I questioned the wisdom of sending more troops even under Bush.
Unfortunately, the failure of Pakistan to control their side of the border and their decision in 2006 (by their intelligence people) to provide support to the Taliban has meant that arguably since about a year or so ago, the Taliban have been able to outstrip our ability to put Afghan security forces in the field. Thus the balance is tipping to the enemy noticably.
While I don't think the Taliban are anywhere close to winning even now, the level of combat is intensifying. We're seeing the enemy able to mass lots of men against our positions near the Afghan border with Pakistan. We face a stalemate at elevated casualty levels that we'd need to maintain for many years until the Afghans field enough troops to replace our men or until the Pakistanis can control their side of the border.
I'm also very worried about putting too many troops into landlocked Afghanistan with our land supply lines going through Pakistan and Russia.
Nonetheless, given the lack of support on the left side of the aisle for fighting what they hitherto called the "good war" and the inclination of many on the right to adopt the "more rubble, less trouble" strategy of just trying to kill our way to victory (they called for this in Iraq many times as we faced setbacks there--which I called a mistaken strategy all along), I concluded that I'd trust the military if they say they need X number of troops to win:
Notwithstanding my many doubts as to how we will fight the planned campaign. I have to trust the Pentagon understands the problem. I can't see most of what they see. I won't pretend to be a four-star.
And if adding 45,000 troops can achieve enough results fast enough to let us then draw down to 30,000 or so troops than adding lesser amounts, then we might as well attempt victory. Lesser amounts mean we need more time. And with the pack of ninnies we have in Congress these days, I don't know how long we can keep them from running away just as fast as they can.
Pound the enemy. Protect the people. Go for the win.
The bottom line is that our governing class lacks the patience to win a protracted war in Afghanistan if we have anywhere near our current level of casualties. So the only option is to try to win faster by substituting our troops for Afghan troops that don't yet exist but which will come on line in the next several years, while trying to atomize the enemy inside Afghanistan to make it easier for poorer quality local forces to handle the enemy.
But keep in mind that a surge in Afghanistan will be tougher than the Iraq surge, because even in Iraq the enemy never could manage a decent insurgency (it was a terror campaign of IEDs with few attacks at even the platoon level). Their foreign santuaries in Syria and Iran didn't provide them with the means to put hundreds of men (a small battalion) into a single battle against isolated outposts or units the way Pakistani sanctuaries allow the enemy to send across large units to try to overrun a small American unit.
The same people who spent years claiming Afghanistan was the real fight against our jihadi enemies are now trying to peddle the line that Afghanistan is no big deal, and nothing bad would happen if we pulled out or even lost control of the place to the Taliban. These same people suddenly ignore Pakistan and how that place could fall apart if we lose next door.
Don't believe them. We need to win in Afghanistan and I'm willing to trust General McChrystal that he needs what he says he needs, that we can win with that amount and the right strategy, and that we can handle the logistics problem.
To Hell with exit strategies--win.
UPDATE: Yes. More US troops buy time for Afghans to come on line by holding off the Taliban and by accelerating the improvement of Afghan security forces that must eventually replace us:
To rescue Afghanistan's security forces through partnering and advising, the U.S. unquestionably needs the extra 30,000 or 40,000 troops that Gen. McChrystal wants. That many troops are required to put American officers—commissioned and noncommissioned—with Afghan soldiers and policemen at all levels and at all times.
Without them, poorly led Afghan security forces will continue to abuse the citizenry more than they abuse the insurgents. And current rhetoric about "protecting the population" and "engaging the tribes" will end up with the millions of other words that never leapt from the strategy documents to the field.
There is a purpose to adding more US troops. As I wrote early this year:
Inside the ring road buffer zone, we'll help Afghan militias we pay for and regular Afghan security forces tear up the Taliban presence, with Coalition air power keeping the enemy atomized as much as possible to prevent them from massing and overwhelming these dispersed Afghan/Coalition small units very often.
Those Afghan/Coalition units I had in mind using Coalition air power would be Afghan units stiffened with Western components to help with leadership, logistics, and calling in our firepower.
