Pakistan has nuclear weapons and a minority of jihadis who would love to run the place and control the nukes.
And continued military rule makes the jihadis seem like freedom fighters.
So the problem is that we'd like to have democracy in Pakistan to keep the jihadis from gaining support. In time, a majority of Pakistanis might think a mullah government is better than military dictatorship.
Yet we need Pakistan's help as is to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan, so we can't pressure Pakistan for democracy too much for fear we'd lose the help in Afghanistan.
And as the Pakistani generals placate their jihadis by looking the other way as much as possible while the jihadis roam the border areas and fight in Afghanistan, we react by pressuring Pakistan to crack down on the jihadis.
Under our Realpolitik approach to Pakistan since 9/11, the Islamists have been able to make headway by pointing out the corruption of the civilian politicians and the failure of the military rulers (backed by 10% of the population) to solve corruption or economic problems.
Democracy, of course, requires rule of law too and not just voting that puts in power your gang of thieves. So the problem is that the long-term solution is real democracy but in the short run the imperfections of democracy building in Pakistan makes it more likely that the Islamists will gain support under pre-democracy voting.
So when Bhutto returns to Pakistan in a deal for power sharing that could renew civilian rule and the voting that led to Musharaff's benign dictatorship, it is a cause for some hope but also great fear. The path to real democracy has to start somewhere but the early period on that path is dangerous. And Bhutto was as corrupt as any of the politicians. Is she now?
One can understand the temptation to rely on a strongman who will keep the lid on the vast nuclear-armed nation. But the lid has not stopped the Islamists from gaining strength on the frontier tribal areas. Nor has it stopped the problem of their fanaticism from spilling over to Pakistan's cities as the Red Mosque incident and the bombing attempt on Bhutto upon her return show:
"We believe democracy alone can save Pakistan from disintegration and a militant takeover," Bhutto told reporters in her Karachi home a day after her return from eight years in exile.
It remains unclear what effect the attack will have on the talks between Bhutto and President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who have been in negotiations over creating a power-sharing agreement. Their talks yielded an immunity covering the corruption charges that prompted Bhutto to leave Pakistan.
Pakistan's Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said he did not expect the attack to delay elections slated for January, but the government would have to be alert for future attacks.
"I don't see the electoral process being hindered ... but of course we will have to be wise, we'll perhaps have to change our tactics a little," he said Saturday.
While Bhutto has accused some political allies of Musharraf of militant links, the attack could push the two closer into an alliance to fight extremism — a cause that both reiterated their support for in the aftermath of the bombing.
It was one of the deadliest in Pakistan's history, turning Bhutto's jubilant homecoming parade into a scene of blood and carnage.
Karachi, a normally boisterous city of 15 million, remained largely subdued Saturday, with shopping malls and gas stations closed in several neighborhoods.
So building democracy when Islamists are looking on with their guns and bombs ready to exploit imperfections and flaws in the democractic process represents a very dangerous period.
Fortunately, it looks like Pakistan has finally (as I've argued) realized that no truce with fanatics is possible. Already, Pakistan has escalated their use of force against the Islamists in the frontier area.
This article says Pakistan is going to wage a full offensive to pacify the tribal areas and cripple the Islamists:
Lining up against the Pakistani Army will be the Shura (council) of Mujahideen comprising senior al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders, local clerics, and leaders of the fighting clans Wazir and Mehsud (known as the Pakistani Taliban). The shura has long been calling the shots in the Waziristans, imposing sharia law and turning the area into a strategic command and control hub of global Muslim resistance movements, including those operating in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"All previous operations had a different perspective," the security official told ATol. "In the past Pakistan commenced an operation when the Western coalition informed Pakistan about any particular hide-out or a sanctuary, or Pakistan traced any armed infiltration from or into Pakistan.
"However, the present battle aims to pacify Waziristan once and for all. The Pakistani Army has sent a clear message to the militants that Pakistan would deploy its forces in the towns of Mir Ali, Miranshah, Dand-i-Darpa Kheil, Shawal, Razmak, Magaroti, Kalosha, Angor Ada. The Pakistani Army is aiming to establish permanent bases which would be manned by thousands of military and paramilitary troops."
According to the security official, an ultimatum had been delivered to the militants recently during a temporary ceasefire. The army would set a deadline and give safe passage into Afghanistan to all al-Qaeda members and Taliban commanders who had gathered in Waziristan to launch a large-scale post-Ramadan operation in Afghanistan. They, along with wanted tribal warrior leaders, would all leave Pakistan, and never return.
It remains to be seen if the Islamists will cooperate and run to Afghanistan or if they want to (or are compelled to) stay for the final jihad and go for broke to win the big prize of seizing a nuclear-armed Pakistan.
And even trying to survive in the tribal areas rather than running to Afghanistan where our forces wait to pounce will require a campaign against Pakistan's cities to break the will of the government to stay on the offensive in the frontier region. If Bhutto (and other politicians) won't exploit the violence by claiming they will end the urban bloodshed by striking a new deal, thus continuing the status quo that isn't solving the problem of jihadis in Pakistan or Afghanistan, then the military will have the time to really crush the Islamists.
Or perhaps, as al Qaeda loses in Iraq and retreats from Pakistan, Afghanistan really will become the primary fight against al Qaeda that so many here have insisted on despite the commitment of al Qaeda to winning in Iraq. Of course, as the article notes, a successful pacification campaign in the tribal areas will cripple the ability of the Islamists to fight in Afghanistan. If compelled to stay in Afghanistan 24/7, we will hunt them, find them, and kill them.
But it will be uglier while we do that. Should Afghanistan become the primary fight against al Qaeda, a lot of Americans who have insisted Afghanistan is the "good war" will want to run from this fight, too.
