Russia is stripping troops from other part of the front to reinforce the Donbas front for a fall offensive. Will that work? Will Ukraine exploit that focus by hitting a weakened part of the Russian line? Or will Russia fool us with a big push designed to win the war and not just a battle?
The war goes on. Of note, Russia tried to brush back NATO from the plate with a large drone incursion into Poland, escalating past pressure tactics:
But the flight of multiple Russian drones over Poland this week marks a clear escalation, experts say. NATO responded with overwhelming force.
I suspect none of the drones that were shot down or crashed had warheads. But rather than intimidate NATO into reducing support for Ukraine with a hollow threat to expand the war Russia is already struggling with against Ukraine, this will only speed up NATO efforts to rearm.
Bravo, Putin. You da man.
Russia is also escalating aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities; Ukraine is escalating aerial attacks on Russian strategic targets. Russia still crawls forward yet its casualty rate had fallen in recent months, seemingly exploiting the thin Ukrainian front line:
Russian territorial gains have become less costly over the last four months compared to Spring 2025 as Russian forces are sustaining a lower casualty rate per square kilometer seized.
Yet Ukraine has mounted some significant local counter-attacks.
I've read that Russian reinforcements allocated to a Russian fall offensive include a division from the Kherson front. Does that provide Ukraine with an opportunity?
Is Russia really telegraphing their Big Push?
Russia is massing troops and tanks around the besieged fortress city of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, building up heavy forces for what Ukrainian drone operator Kriegsforscher described as a “last, final battle” for the east. But Ukraine isn’t just waiting around for Russia to attack.
While the Ukrainian ground forces surge reserves into the Pokrovsk sector, the Ukrainian air force, drone branch and special services are bombarding the gathering Russian troops with drones and cruise missiles.
Ground reinforcement and aerial spoiling attacks are Ukraine's immediate response to Russia's troop movements and apparent intention.
Will Russia break Ukraine's ground forces with a Final Offensive in the Pokrovsk region?
But if Russia's ground forces do break, as I've noted repeatedly Ukraine has to attack to reveal and exploit that possible fact. Iraq was able to do that in 1988 because it had greatly enlarged its army, including expanding the Republican Guard regime protection loyalists into a large offensive force. That was key because much of Iraq's army was optimized to hold their fortifications line and incapable of carrying out offensive mobile operations.
Are we even looking for signs? Or do we take Russian bravado at face value and assume Russia's infantry will one day decide the war--on offense?
If Ukraine holds off Russia's fall offensive to finally win the long battle for eastern Ukraine, a broken Russian army might not be noticed in the relief of Ukraine not breaking. Could Ukraine launch a counteroffensive to exploit a culminated and possibly broken Russian army in the east?
I have speculated that Ukraine and NATO surely aren't counting on Ukraine remaining on the strategic defensive just exhausting Russia. I'd expect more in strategic thinking. And with NATO's help, Ukraine did build nine new brigades to attack in summer 2023. So Ukraine could do it again. And if the lesson is that new brigades need more than half a year of training, we've had more than two years pass since the failed summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Is Ukraine preparing for such an offensive with its newly formed corps formations?
While Russian exhaustion could be how the war ends, I can't believe Ukraine's commanders and their NATO friends aren't trying to figure out how Ukraine could seize the initiative somewhere and launch a counteroffensive that will achieve a decisive victory on one section of the front.
Or at least a significant counter-attack to achieve a significant victory over those offensives such as the Poktrovsk region and drive the Russians back from several months worth of advances.
While I mentioned the Pokrovsk region in that post, I speculated that a post-Kursk (1943) style counteroffensive might cross the Dnipro River against a weaker Russian defensive line suffering from the effects of Ukraine's efforts against supplies and Crimea infrastructure:
After two years of rebuilding its army after the failed summer 2023 counteroffensive, could Ukraine be preparing for a river assault at the distant end of Russia's supply lines? With perhaps supporting operations across the now-dry Kakhovka Reservoir that may by now be able to handle the movement and supply of significant forces?
That's my hope for a big win. I think a Pokrovsk region Ukrainian counter-attack would be less decisive as it pushes Russians back to their sources of supplies and reinforcements as well as fortification lines.
Do the Russians have tunnel vision on finally securing all of Donetsk
province that Russia has been trying to capture since 2014? I can't help but wonder if the Russians are feinting at Pokrovsk while preparing for a big push elsewhere in the northeast or north. Russia started to take Vienna Kiev in 2022. Maybe they will finally make a serious effort to take the city in 2025.
Putin pretends Russia could fight forever. He knows Russia can't. Yet Putin hasn't retreated from his objective of total victory. Maybe he will try to achieve total victory so the war just won't go on, week after week.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: Map from Warfare History Network.
