Russia continues to grind forward at high cost to the Russian ground forces in men and material, trying to portray an image of an unstoppable force. And Ukraine seems unable to counter-attack decisively. The brief panty-flinging at Ukraine's ongoing raid into Russia's Kursk region that elevated it into a major invasion of Russia has died down. So naturally there is renewed talk of letting Russia hold its gains since 2014.
Is it a kindness to Ukraine to end the bloodshed--even over Ukrainian objections--by letting Russian aggression stand? I expect calls to repeat the Korean War experience to be revived as a model for success in Ukraine in response to the bloody near-stalemate on the ground.
Russia is seemingly willing to hammer Ukraine ... forever:
The Russian military command has likely ordered Russian forces to conduct a relatively high tempo of mechanized assaults in Ukraine to pursue significant tactical advances before muddy ground conditions in fall 2024 constrain mechanized maneuver. Poor weather conditions in fall 2024 and early winter 2024-2025 will likely complicate and constrain both mechanized and infantry maneuver, but Russian forces may seek to maintain their consistent offensive pressure in eastern Ukraine despite these difficulties.Will Western backers of Ukraine conclude--conveniently--that it should "save" Ukraine from its goal of pushing the Russians out of at least a good chunk of Ukraine by compelling Ukraine to surrender territory to "end" the war?
While the observation that "history doesn't repeat, but it does rhyme" has value, Ukraine does not rhyme with Korea. As I wrote in the summer of 2023, that is a mistake:
The Korea model is one of America standing shoulder-to-shoulder with South Korea against the North Korea threat. Now the author says Ukraine won't get that major feature of the ceasefire--American troops on the DMZ--that gave us the success the author seeks in Ukraine?
How would partition of Ukraine be more than temporary to allow Russia time to rearm if we go into this proclaiming Ukraine is outside of the NATO defensive perimeter? Wasn't the author's long description of the Korea ceasefire based on China accepting it could not outlast America's commitment to fight?
And don't be so sure washing our hands of Ukraine after a ceasefire will keep NATO out of a new Russo-Ukraine war because our stakes are allegedly so low. America committed hundreds of thousands of troops and suffered tens of thousands of casualties to defend South Korea, a new country America had declared outside our defensive perimeter before North Korea invaded.
I reject the Korea model for Ukraine. It would give Putin a badly needed win despite his dismal record of protecting Russia. Until the Korea model is the least-bad option, anyway.
And for a bonus reason to reject the proposal, if you think a partition despite Russia's heavy casualties will discourage China from invading Taiwan, you aren't correctly judging the question of what a Chinese victory is.
I noted in that post that before the war I said I wouldn't be surprised if we ended up with a free West Ukraine and a Russian satellite East Ukraine. But that was based on my pre-war judgment, that relied on Russia effectively using its over-rated military. We can and should do better now.
We might comfort ourselves that we won't pay for being wrong because Ukraine will pay the price. But Russia being full after digesting Ukrainian territory is not the same as being friendly. All we'll do is delay the day when we too pay the price of whetting Russia's appetite for a buffer that can never be deep enough to soothe their paranoia.
Have a super sparkly day.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
