The Afghanistan government was in a tough position because of our decision to leave prematurely. I don't think it was inevitable that the Taliban would win completely. But our actions made a Taliban victory far more likely.
More crucially, it has meant the disappearance of close air support, logistics, intelligence and surveillance, repair and maintenance of weapons and vehicles, medevac units for the wounded, and rapid helicopter transport from one part of the country to another. [para] Several senior U.S. military officers (active duty and retired) have told me that American ground troops couldn’t fight effectively without these enablers. It is no wonder that Afghan ground troops can’t either.
Yes. Indeed, in the 2011 NATO war on Khaddafi, European forces proved they couldn't fight for long without American help. Even American troops need those enablers to fight.
I don't think the Taliban were ever destined
to win. That's the excuse so many throw around as a reason to retreat and abandon what we achieved. Although the failure to slow down the Taliban weakened my hopes for preventing that outcome a great deal right before the fall of Kabul.
If we could have sustained enough of the enabling logistics support, the Taliban could have been too weak to topple the government although strong enough to carve out areas of control.
Again, I thought there was a morale danger zone Afghan forces had to get through. But they had to have a chance to get through that danger zone:
Psychology also plays a critical role. To the masses, the Taliban increasingly looks like it is an unstoppable force on course to topple the Afghan government. That outcome is not inevitable, but the danger of public amplification of the Taliban’s power is that it risks triggering a cascade of Afghan security forces and other rivals joining the Taliban because it does not pay to be on the losing side.
That's exactly right. But psychology cascaded against the government dramatically this last week. America did not help enough to arrest that defeatism cascade.
Truly, bugging out was a mistake. The Taliban don't care about the "peace process". The Taliban don't care about being branded war criminals. They care about victory. And we made their victory more likely.
But who cares? We got a "normal" president who isn't mean.
Pray we don't experience the consequences of defeat too badly.
UPDATE: So now we have to decide how long to defend a perimeter around the Kabul airport to evacuate the people we deem worthy of saving from the Taliban victors.
How many desperate once-friends will our troops have to kill to hold the line and keep them from disrupting the evacuation?
UPDATE: We held Afghanistan with 2,500 support troops. Which we did for 19-1/2 years Now we'll see if we can hold Kabul airport for a week with 5,000 6,000 combat troops.
UPDATE: Even the Taliban were surprised by their speed of victory.
UPDATE: This is an excellent point and I'm disappointed with myself for not thinking of it:
In withdrawing now, not only is Biden withdrawing U.S. military forces from Afghanistan relatively early in his presidency, he’s withdrawing during the country’s well-known fighting season. Withdrawing in winter, instead of summer, would likely have led to a different outcome, especially if the withdrawal had been planned well and that plan executed in concert with our NATO allies.
Biden wanted the anniversary and not the best time to withdraw. The timing alone might have gotten the government through the danger zone I warned about.
UPDATE: Oh, Holy God:
An administration official who was not authorized to speak on the record told me that there are an estimated 10,000 U.S. citizens in the country, with the vast majority in or near Kabul.
What part of our extensive big-brained adult planning covered this clusterfuck?
