Withdrawing most of our troops from the Middle East isn't a retreat. America can afford to reduce troop strength if we don't just ignore the region and hope for the best.
The recent assassination of Iranian physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh may not have been an American-led operation, but it nonetheless raised the risk of reprisal attacks, quite possibly targeting U.S. bases. The vulnerability of American military bases in the Middle East to missile attack is not new, but growing Iranian capabilities make U.S. assets deployed in the region more vulnerable. In recognition of this threat, a rethink of U.S. basing architecture is needed.
What I am most interested in is the reminder that prior to the Iran-Iraq War when we added force to protect oil exports, America's military presence in the Persian Gulf region was minimal.
So as time went on, the need for American military power in the region went up. Our peak commitments in Iraq reached about 180,000 while in Afghanistan it reached 100,000.
And don't forget that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the still-future Chinese military rise allowed America to commit force to the region without risking higher priority theaters.
Still, we eventually beat this Iran/al Qaeda effort in Iraq. And even our surge in Afghanistan left Afghan forces that could carry on the fight. In Iraq War 2.0 against ISIL and in current Afghanistan, we can see that we don't need 100,000+ troops in direct combat. Locals with our support and special forces can carry on the day-to-day fighting.
So it is possible for America to reduce our combat role and rely on local allies and on our proven ability to rapidly deploy forces if they are needed. The problem is that in the visuals the world has gotten used to seeing a lot of American forces in combat as a concrete demonstration of our commitment.
But a reduction in our military power doesn't mean our commitment is lower. It means the need for our military power in the region to back our commitment is going down after spiking from about 1973 to 2009 (although the surges in Afghanistan extended that to 2011 or so). Eventually locals will get used to our lower footprint and lower level of direct combat without thinking it means less commitment.
A number of events prompted the dispatch of American troops to watch and fight enemies, including the fall of the Shah of Iran who America armed to be our local "policeman" to keep the Gulf quiet. Replacing that Iran with the mullah-run "Death to America!" Iran was a major flip.
Our wars and diplomatic efforts since then allow America to reduce troop strength and lower our military actions since the peak need for American troops.
This draw down of troops is a sign of potential victory as long as we don't just walk away and hope for the best. And Iran is currently the biggest problem in the region that could undermine all that we've achieved (and note I was wrong to give Obama the benefit of the doubt on Iran policy, which as I address in this more recent post is a mess of failed assumptions and process if the goal is to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons).
My only worry is that we assume the relative stability that allows our draw down wasn't achieved by the troops we think we don't need. Our military power and activity can't go to zero any time soon unless we want to risk the relative stability we have achieved. Withdraw--but verify the freedom to do that.
