Japan is returning to the sea to defend the status quo of the existing international order.
Japan is shifting focus south to face China:
Throughout the Cold War, the MSDF’s strategic orientation was directed to the north and west, towards the Soviet Union. The MSDF’s missions were to defend Japan’s home islands from the Soviet Pacific Fleet and help the U.S. Navy protect the sea lanes of communication across the Pacific Ocean. Naturally, those missions put a premium on anti-air and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. ...
But the first inklings of change were already in the making. In 2001, a Chinese navy surveillance ship circumnavigated Japan for the first time.[1] While top Japanese leaders worried at the time whether it was a portent of the future, they did little in response. They were more concerned about wringing more efficiency out of the navy. By 2004, they trimmed the size of the MSDF’s fleet and consolidated its command structure. But a few years later, rising Chinese assertiveness over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in China) in the East China Sea and the rapid growth in Chinese naval capabilities finally convinced Tokyo to reorient the MSDF southward.
The shift was also reflected in Japan’s national policy. Over the course of the next decade, Tokyo became ever more concerned about its southern maritime border. The level of that concern could even be quantified in Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which outlines the country’s security plans every five years. Between the 2013 and 2018 editions of the NDPG, the number of references to China doubled. In a decided departure from earlier iterations, the 2018 NPDG openly called Beijing’s “unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo” as “incompatible with the existing international order.”[2] Though perhaps not fighting words, they were, for a normally diplomatic Japan, remarkable.
The essay also describes how Japan has begun to create a balanced fleet with capabilities to fight for and retake islands to the south, with a focus on China. But Japan will need to actually expand its forces to really create the capability to fight south.
Some time ago I wrote about Japan's recognition of the threat of rising China--which other states also noted, of course--which resulted in the shifting of their focus from north in order to defend Hokkaido Island to the southern ocean front:
Japan is about to put forth a plan to defend themselves in the seas around Japan and in their air over that same space. For any other country, such a shift would be a normal thing to do. For Japan, still in the shadow of World War II, this is a big deal. Defending Hokkaido from a Soviet airborne and amphibious assault is not high on the priority list of Japan's military these days. China, however, has moved up quite a bit[.]
The Chinese predictably did little to reduce Japan's growing worries.
And it was easy to see the end point of Japan's shift of focus--if the resources and people are allocated.
UPDATE: China's threatening bombast and behavior are driving Japan and Australia to an alliance.
